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IV

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Section 78-2a-3(2)(a) (2006); see also Utah Code Ann. § 63-46(b)-16(l) (2006)
(providing for judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings).
ISSUE
Did the Utah Labor Commission improperly promulgate and apply Utah
Administrative Rule 612-1-lO.D.l.c, a Rule that conflicts with Utah Code Section 34A2-413(1 )(c)(iv) because it improperly modifies the statutory definition of "other work
reasonably available."
Standard of Review: Questions of statutory construction are matters of law, and
the court gives no deference to an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute,
relying on a "correction of error" standard. Chris & Dick's Lumber v. Tax Com'n, 791
P.2d 511 (Utah 1990). In some cases, the court gives some deference to the
administrative agency, when the agency's expertise is applicable. However, such
deference is not warranted here because the determination of whether an administrative
rule conflicts with legislation is a pure question of law for which no deference is given to
the agency.

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. ORDINANCES. RULES AND
REGULATIONS
The following statutes and administrative rules are determinative. Because of the
length of some, citations are provided below and the full text of each is set forth in
addenda to the brief.
1.

Utah Code Section 34A-2-413(c)(iv) (1997)
(c) To find an employee permanently totally disabled, the commission
shall conclude that:
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably
available, taking into consideration the employee's age, education, past
work experience, medical capacity, and residual functional capacity.

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(c)(iv) (1997) (emphasis added).1

1

While there is no substantive difference between the current statute and the 1997
version in effect at the time of the accident, the 1997 version is provided and applied
herein. The differences are stylistic, with formatting subsections (a) through (e) having
been added to the language to permit easier reading. The 2007 statute reads:
(c) To establish that an employee is permanently totally disabled the employee
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available,
taking into consideration the employee's:
(A) age;
(B) education;
(C) past work experience;
(D) medical capacity; and
(E) residual functional capacity.
2

2.

Utah Code Section 34A-8-102 (1997)
This chapter is intended to promote and monitor the state's and the employer's
capacity to assist the injured worker in returning to the work force as quickly
as possible . . . .

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(c)(iv) (1997) (emphasis added) (setting forth the "Intent
Statement" for the Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act).
3.

Utah code Section 34A-8-104 (1997)

(3)(b) Factors to be considered in determining gainful employment include the
injured worker's:
(i)
education;
(ii)
experience; and
(iii) physical and mental impairment and condition.
4.

Utah Code Section 34A-8-108 (1997)
(1) The division shall administer this chapter with the objective of assisting in
returning the disabled injured worker to gainful employment....

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-8-108 (1997) (setting forth priorities for assisting workers to
return to gainful employment).
5.

Utah Administrative Code R612-1-10
A. This rule applies to claims for permanent total disability compensation under
the Utah Workers' Compensation Act.
D. For purposes of this rule, the following standards and definitions apply:
1. Other work reasonably available: Subject to medical restrictions and
other provisions of the Act and rules, other work is reasonably available
to a claimant if such work meets the following criteria:
a. The work is either within the distance that a resident of the
claimant's community would consider to be a typical or acceptable
commuting distance, or is within the distance the claimant was traveling to
work prior to his or her accident;
b. The work is regular, steady, and readily available; and
3

c. The work provides a gross income at least equivalent to:
(1) The current state average weekly wage, if at the time
of the accident the claimant was earning more than the
state average weekly wage then in effect; or
(2) The wage the claimant was earning at the time of the
accident, if the employee was earning less than the state
average weekly wage then in effect.
Utah Admin. Code R612-1-10.D.1.C (2007) (emphasis added).
6.

Utah Administrative Code R612-8-9
A Reemployment plan (Form 209) shall be provided for injured workers who are
identified on the initial assessment as needing reemployment assistance, due to an
industrial accident or illness which creates a significant barrier preventing a return
to the work force. Significant barriers include, but are not limited to: 1)
impairment(s) resulting from the industrial accident(s) or illness which prevent the
employee from performing the essential functions of the work activity for which
the employee has been qualified until the time of the industrial accident; 2) lack of
transferable skills; 3) education/training; and 4) age. The plan shall not be
provided for those injured workers who have previously been screened out through
Form 206. The report should contain a return-to-work plan outlining employee
demographics, functional limitations, type of plan, specific job target or
employment category, specific tasks, time frames for completion and costs. Parties
responsible for carrying out each task shall be identified (i.e., employee, employer,
qualified rehabilitation provider, and insurance carrier). The plan shall be
completed by a qualified rehabilitation provider (as defined by Section 34A-8-109)
and filed within 30 days of the Initial Assessment.

Utah Admin. Code R612-8-9 (2007).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The instant petition presents an issue of first impression, specifically, whether
Utah Administrative Rule 612-1-lO.D.l.c. is in conflict with Utah Code Section 34A-2413(l)(c)(iv).
Mr. Michael McGee filed a workers' compensation claim for permanent total
disability benefits. Instead of applying the statutory standard found in Utah Code Section
4

34A-2-413(c)(iv) which sets forth what must be proven to establish that an employee is
permanently disabled and thereby entitled to these benefits, the Labor Commission
applied Utah Administrative Rule R612-1-1 O.D.I .c. This Administrative Rule conflicts
with the statutory standard and goes beyond the statutory mandate by promulgating a test
that considers factors not permitted by the statutory standard.
Taking into consideration the statutory factors of McGee's age, education, past
work experience, medical capacity and residual functional capacity, evidence was
presented showing McGee could work - there was other work reasonably available to him
that would allow him to return to the workforce. Notwithstanding the availability of this
employment, the Labor Commission concluded that McGee was entitled to permanent
total disability benefits because the wages for this gainful employment were not up to an
acceptable standard - they just didn't pay enough. Applying a test promulgated by the
Commission as set forth in Administrative Rule R612-1-10.D.1.C., the Labor Commission
concluded that even though McGee was capable of working, and even though work was
available, because the wages were not enough, according to the administrative rule, it was
preferable to award permanent total disability benefits.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In November 2002, McGee filed an Application for Hearing seeking Workers'
Compensation benefits asserting claims for medical expenses, recommended medical
care, temporary total disability compensation, permanent partial disability compensation,

5

and interest related to an alleged July 4, 2001 industrial injury with LPI Services.
(R.0002.)
In August 2003, McGee filed an Amended Application seeking permanent total
disability compensation. (R. 00025.)
In October 2003 an administrative hearing was held. (R. 0033-0047.) Jobs were
identified for the ALJ that constituted gainful employment for Mr. McGee, but the
available jobs paid a wage lower than the State average weekly wage. (R. 0033-0048.)
During the administrative hearing, it was established that McGee earned $17.50 per hour
at the time of the alleged injury. (R. 0034, 0040-41.) The average weekly wage for the
State of Utah as of July 4, 2001, equaled $13.85 per hour. (R. 0040-41) As a result, the
ALJ determined that Mr. McGee's wage exceeded the current State average weekly wage
for the date of injury.
During the administrative hearing, the defendants' vocational expert, Dirk
Evertsen, testified that Mr. McGee was capable of working as a lens stylist at Lens
Crafters with a starting wage of $7.00 per hour, plus commissions of $2.50 per hour or
more and income potential of between $12.00 to $13.00 per hour. Mr. Evertsen also
testified that McGee could perform a car rental reservationist job with a starting wage of
$7.29 per hour, plus commissions of $2.50 per hour or more and income potential of
between $12.00 to $13.00 per hour. (R. 0040.)
In April 2004, the administrative law judge issued his Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order. (R. 0033-48.) The ALJ entered a tentative finding of
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permanent total disability on the basis that even though Mr. Evertsen established that
other work was reasonably available through at least two specific jobs, both gainful
employment, those jobs did not qualify as other work reasonably available pursuant to the
new Utah Administrative Rule 612-1-lO.D.l, which went into effect in January 2003. (R.
0045.) The decision was contrary to State statute, applying an administrative rule that
conflicts with Legislative statutory mandate. Utah Code Section 34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv)
states that in order to be permanently disabled, an employee must prove that, inter alia, he
or she cannot perform "other work reasonably available, taking into consideration the
employee's age, education, past work experience, medical capacity, and residual
functional capacity." The administrative rule purports to define what constitutes "other
work reasonably available" by taking into consideration gross income, available wage
rates, and the current state average weekly wage, and by imposing a minimum wage rate
that must be satisfied before available gainful employment can constitute "other work
reasonably available."
The ALJ applied this improper administrative standard, stating that "[t]he two jobs
located by Mr. Evertsen as lens stylist and car rental reservationist at most paid $13.00
per hour, or less than the average weekly wage for the State of Utah as of July 4, 2001."
(R. 0045.) Accordingly, even though McGee could work and was able to work, because
the wage was less than the current State average weekly wage, the ALJ determined that
"no evidence existed that any employment remained reasonably available to Mr. McGee
as of the date of the hearing pursuant to the requirements of Utah Code § 34A-27

413(a)(c)(iv) and Utah Administrative Code R. 612-1-lO.D.l.c." (R.0045.) The ALJ
identified no problems with the jobs identified by Dirk Evertsen other than the fact that
the jobs paid less than the current State average weekly wage.

(R.0045.)

In April 2004, the defendants filed a notice of intent to file a reemployment plan,
which was filed in May 2004. (R.0049-50; R. 0053-72.) In September 2004, an
evidentiary hearing was held with respect to the reemployment plan. (R.0143.) In
February 2005, the ALJ issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an Order,
wherein the defendants' reemployment plan was determined to be reasonably designed to
return McGee to gainful employment. (R.0143-147.)
In March 2005, an Order was signed allowing the parties to file any Motions for
Review on or before April 15, 2005, to allow for administrative review of the ALJ's
decision by the Appeals Board of the Labor Commission. (R. 0150-51.) Defendants filed
a timely Motion for Review contesting the ALJ's finding that McGee is permanently and
totally disabled. (R. 0154-67.) The primary argument asserted that Rule 612-1-10.D.1
was improperly promulgated as contrary to State statute, and that McGee could not be
found permanently and totally disabled when gainful employment was available which
constitutes, applying the statutory standard, "other work reasonably available, taking into
consideration the employee's age, education, past work experience, medical capacity, and
residual functional capacity." (R. 0157-66.) McGee opposed the Motion for Review,
claiming that the consideration of gross income, available wage rates, and the current
state average weekly wage rate "did not 'abridge, enlarge, extend, or modify'" the
8

statutory standard and its five criteria. (R. 0170.) McGee also claimed that the statutory
criteria were simply a starting point, or "minimum considerations"; and other criteria
beyond the legislative factors could be considered by the Labor Commission. (R. 017273.)
On December 28, 2006, the Commission issued its Order affirming the ALJ's
decision. (R. 0193-97.) The Order suggested that Administrative Rule 612-1-lO.D.l was
proper because, the Labor Commission claimed, the consideration of gross income,
available wage rates, and the current state average weekly wage rate were all necessary to
the consideration of "past work experience," one of the permitted criteria in Utah Code
Section 34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv). (R. 0193-204.) The Labor Commission acknowledged it
took a "broader view of the statutory term 'past work experience'" than defendants. (R.
202.) Unsurprisingly, the Labor Commission was not persuaded that its "broad"
administrative rule conflicted with state legislation. (R. 0201-203, claiming that the
consideration of gross income, available wage rates, and the current state average weekly
wage pursuant to Administrative Rule R612-1-10.D.I.e., and the consideration of
commuting distance and steadiness of the work, pursuant to Administrative Rule R612-110.D.1 a. & b., was compatible with the five statutory criteria of "age, education, past
work experience, medical capacity, and residual functional capacity.")
A timely Petition for Review was filed with the Utah Court of Appeals on January
24, 2007, thereby vesting this court with appellate jurisdiction.

9

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Award of Permanent Total Disability benefits to McGee must be overturned
because the Administrative Rule applied by the Labor Commission is invalid because it
conflicts with state legislation. The ALJ held that available, gainful employment jobs
identified by the defendants as "other work reasonably available" for McGee were
unacceptable solely because the jobs did not pay enough money - they did not provide a
wage at or above the current State average weekly wage that Rule 612-1-1 O.D.I purports
to require. The statute, however, which establishes what constitutes "other work
reasonably available," sets forth five specific criteria for consideration, and it does not
provide for consideration of gross income, available wage rates, or the current State
average weekly wage. Defendants contend that the Rule improperly expands the statutory
definition of "other work reasonably available," which permits consideration of only age,
education, past work experience, medical capacity, and residual functional capacity.
As indicated by the ALJ, the jobs identified were appropriate given McGee's work
injury and his transferrable skills. The only deficiency identified by the ALJ was the
lower wage provided by these jobs. Because the Commission lacks authority to enact and
rely on a Rule that expands the statute to include consideration of non-statutory factors,
the award of permanent total disability benefits must be overturned.

10

ARGUMENT
I.

The Utah Labor Commission Exceeded Its Rule-Making Authority by
Creating an Administrative Rule which Enlarged and Substantively Amended
the Workers' Compensation Act.
In enacting Utah Code Section 34A-2-413(l)(c), the Utah Legislature set forth five

criteria that may be considered by the Labor Commission in determining whether or not
an applicant is permanently totally disabled. The Labor Commission promulgated an
administrative rule that purports to permit the consideration of additional factors.
Because the administrative rule expands the statute, it is in conflict with statutory law,
and is therefore invalid.
A.

Longstanding Utah law provides that administrative rules may not
conflict with state statutes

When an administrative rule conflicts with a statute,"[t]he rule m u s t . . . yield to
the statute." The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "[i]t is a long-standing principle of
administrative law that an agency's rules must be consistent with its governing statutes."
Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Audit Div. of the Utah State tax Comm'n. 846 P.2d 1304, 1306
(Utah 1993). An administrative rule that is out of harmony with a statute is invalid. Id.;
see also Draughon v. Dep't of Financial Institutions, State of Utah. 975 P.2d 935, 937
(Utah Ct. App. 1999) (explaining that unharmonious rules conflict with state statute and
thereby "in effect amend that statute." In Draughon, the court further clarified the
limitations on administrative rule-making: "When an administrative official misconstrues
a statute and issues a regulation beyond the scope of a statute, it is in excess of
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administrative authority granted. Agency regulations may not abridge, enlarge, extend or
modify a statute." 975 P.2d at 937; see also Crowther v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 762
P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (holding that administrative rule was invalid as
having exceeded its authority where legislature had "not clearly declared its policy").
B.

The Administrative Rule purporting to permit consideration of factors
not permitted by the statute must be declared invalid

Utah Administrative Rule 612-1-10.D.1 conflicts with Section 34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv)
of the Workers' Compensation Act. The statute does not permit the consideration of
gross income, current available wage rates, or the current state average weekly wage. By
permitting the consideration of non-statutory factors, the administrative rule
impermissibly expands the statute. First, the plain language of the text provides no
permission to consider the wage factors set forth by the administrative rule. Second, the
Labor Commission's application of the rule, specifically its failure to set forth or apply
the statutory criteria, impermissibly expanded the statute. Third, other cases, including
Utah cases, have held that administrative rules which purport to define statutory terms
have impermissibly modified the statute requiring invalidation of the administrative rules;
and applying these cases to the instant case, the administrative rule must be invalidated.
Fourth, this court has already identified problems with other portions of this same
administrative rule.

12

1.

Straightforward analysis of the plain language of the text
demonstrates that the administrative rule impermissibly expands
the statute

The Utah Labor Commission has no inherent authority. All powers, rights, duties,
and responsibilities of the Utah Labor Commission are granted by the Utah Legislature.
Utah Code. Ann. 34A-1-103 (1997). Utah Code Section 34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv) states what
may be considered by the Labor Commission in determining whether an employee is
permanently totally disabled. The Labor Commission is statutorily mandated to evaluate
whether "the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking into
consideration the employee's age, education, past work experience, medical
capacity, and residual functional capacity." (Emphasis added.) The statute contains
no wage consideration. The statute makes no mention of the consideration of gross
income, wage rates, or the sate average weekly wage. The administrative rule that
purports to permit consideration of these factors impermissibly expands the statute and is
therefore void and must be declared invalid.
Comparing the plain language of the statutory text against the text of the
administrative rule, the administrative rule sets forth additional considerations beyond the
five statutory criteria for what constitutes other work reasonably available and thereby
improperly expands the statute. The version of Utah Code Section 34A-2-413 in effect at
the time of the accident reads, in relevant part:
(c) To find an employee permanently totally disabled, the commission
shall conclude that:
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(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably
available, taking into consideration the employee's age, education, past
work experience, medical capacity, and residual functional capacity.
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(c)(iv) (1997) (emphasis added).2 Utah Administrative
Code R612-1-10.D reads as follows:
D. For purposes of this rule, the following standards and definitions apply:
1. Other work reasonably available: Subject to medical restrictions and
other provisions of the Act and rules, other work is reasonably available
to a claimant if such work meets the following criteria:
a. The work is either within the distance that a resident of the
claimant's community would consider to be a typical or acceptable
commuting distance, or is within the distance the claimant was traveling to
work prior to his or her accident;
b. The work is regular, steady, and readily available; and
c. The work provides a gross income at least equivalent to:
(1) The current state average weekly wage, if at the time
of the accident the claimant was earning more than the
state average weekly wage then in effect; or
(2) The wage the claimant was earning at the time of the
accident, if the employee was earning less than the state
average weekly wage then in effect.
Utah Admin. Code R612-1-10.D.1.C (2007).
The Labor Commission's Order claims that the statutory criterion of "past work
experience" necessarily permits consideration of gross income, current wage rates, and
the current state average weekly wage. The Labor Commission's argument must be
rejected as a matter of straightforward textual analysis. First, the consideration of past
work experience does not permit consideration of current wages. When interpreting

2

See footnote 1, supra, explaining that while there is no subslantive difference
between the current statute and the 1997 version in effect at the time of the accident, the
1997 version is provided and applied herein.
14

statutes, Utah courts "presume that the legislature used each term advisedly," and thereby
must construe statutes to give effect to each term. See, e.g., State v. Tooele County, 2002
UT 8, If 10, 44 P.3d 680. The Legislature used the term "past work experience." The
term "past" does not permit consideration of current available wages, nor does it permit
consideration of the "current state average weekly wage." Utah Admin. Code. R R612-1lO.D.l.c. (2007). Second, the consideration of work experience does not necessarily
permit consideration of wages. Experience is defined as "practical knowledge, skill, or
practice derived from direct observation of or participation in events or in a particular
activity [;] the length of such participation <has 10 years [experience] in the job>." (See
"Experience," Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 1993). In other words,
"[w]ork experience is the experience that a person has working, or working in a specific
field or occupation," irrespective of any type of wages. See Wikipedia,
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wikiAVork_experience>. Experience does not necessarily imply
wages or compensation. If the Legislature had wanted to permit consideration of wages
or compensation in conjunction with consideration of experience, it would have said so.
It did not. Accordingly, from a straightforward textual analysis, the administrative rule
improperly expands the statute.
The Labor Commission itself also previously defined the term "experience" in a
manner inconsistent with the statute and its new rule. Utah Code Section 34A-2413(6)(a)(i) requires reemployment plans for those initially found permanently and totally
disabled to comply with the Reemployment Act. The Reemployment Act, as with the
15

Workers' Compensation Act, requires consideration of "experience". Utah Code Ann. §
34A-8-104(3)(b)(i) (1997). The Commission, in promulgating a rule governing
reemployment plans indicated that the plans consider "1) impairment(s) resulting from
the industrial accident(s) or illness which prevent the employee from performing the
essential functions of the work activity for which the employee has been qualified until
the time of the industrial accident; 2) lack of transferable skills; 3) education/training;
and 4) age." Administrative Rule R612-8-9. Comparing that Rule to Section 34A-2413(6)(a)(i), "transferable skills" is equivalent to "past work experience." The
Commission, however, has now impermissibly expanded the statutory language and
criteria by adopting and applying a new administrative rule definition of "past work
experience" to include consideration of the wage the injured worker made at his or her
last job and consideration of the current state average weekly wage.
The legislature set forth a specific list of statutory criteria for a determining
whether other work is reasonably available. There is no requirement in the statute that
permits consideration of a gross income at least equivalent to the current state average
weekly wage. Instead, the statute requires that other work reasonably available must
consider age, education, past work experience, medical capacity and residual functional
capacity.
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2.

The Labor Commission's application of the statute in this case
impermissibly expanded the statute

The Labor Commission's application of the administrative rule in this case
improperly expanded the statute. Specifically, the Labor Commission failed to even set
forth, much less apply, the statutory criteria.
The Labor Commission must set forth and apply the statutorily mandated factors
the Legislature directed that the employee must prove. The Legislature has mandated that
in order to find that an employee is permanently totally disabled the Labor Commission
must conclude that "(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably
available, taking into consideration the employee's age, education, past work experience,
medical capacity, and residual functional capacity." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(c)(iv)
(1997). Of necessity, these factors must be set forth and applied by the Labor
Commission.
The Labor Commission failed to set forth and apply the statutory factors. In
considering whether there was "other work reasonably available" to McGee, the ALJ's
Order never even mentions the five statutory criteria. Instead, the ALJ's Findings of Fact
section sets forth summaries of the testimony of competing experts (R. 0039-40), and then
explains McGee's wages history and compares the wages of the current available jobs
proposed by defendants' expert to the state average weekly wage. (R. 0040.) There is no
analysis of McGee's age, education, or past work experience. (R.0039-40.) An order
that would have properly followed and applied the statutory criteria would have listed the
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criteria and then included an explanation of how each criterion applied. Instead of
following the statute, the Labor Commission favored it's own rule that purports to permit
the consideration of factors other than those set forth in the statute. The ALJ's
Conclusions of Law further cements the fact that the ALJ simply bypassed the statutory
criteria in favor of the administrative rule. (R. 0044-46.) The Conclusions of Law
section contains more than two pages of nothing more than the application of the rule.
(R. 0044-46.) There is no mention of McGee's education, let alone any analysis of how
his age, education, or past work experience, i.e. transferable skills, would aid, or hinder,
him from obtaining other work reasonably available. (R. 0044-46.) Instead, the ALJ
defended his improper exclusive use of the administrative rule instead of applying the
statutory criteria. (R. 0044-46.)
The Labor Commission Appeals Board's Order affirming the ALJ's decision also
fails to set forth and apply the statutory criteria. (R. 0200-204.) The Appeals Board's
"Discussion and Conclusions of Law" states that Section 34A-4-413(l)(c)(iv) is the
governing statute, but instead of applying the criteria, the Appeals Board goes on to
defend their decision to adopt an administrative rule that adds additional criteria. (R.
0201.) Specifically, in quoting and defending the administrative rule, the Appeals Board
notes that the administrative rule's additional criteria include (1) commuting distance, (R.
201, R612-l-10.D.l.l.a), (2) the steadiness of available work (R.0201, R612-1lO.D.l.l.b), (3) potential gross income of current available work, taking into
consideration (4) the current state average weekly wage, and (5) the wage the claimant
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was earning at the time of the accident. (R. 0201-02, R612-l-10.D.l.l.c.(l) & (2).) In
defending the administrative rule, the Appeals Board went on to acknowledge it took a
"broader view of the statutory term 'past work experience'" than defendants, pointing out
that the administrative rule purported to permit consideration of "the injured worker's
residence [and] previous wage levels." (R.0202.) As noted above, these additional
criteria are not statutory criteria, nor do they necessarily have anything to do with "past
work experience." In the end, instead of applying the statutory criteria, the Appeals
Board argued in favor of its rule, a rule that expands the statutory criteria, and then
applied the rule. In so doing, the Appeals Board failed to set forth the statutory criteria,
and failed to apply the statutory criteria in any way.
This analysis and result is supported by Norton v. Industrial Comm'n, 728 P.2d
1025 (Utah 1986). In Norton, the Industrial Commission's ruling was invalidated
because the Commission failed to set forth and apply the proper criteria. Id. at 1026, 28.
At issue in Norton was the Industrial Commission's determination of whether a worker
was permanently, totally disabled. Id. at 1026. At the time, the Commission was required
to consider the worker's age, sex, education, economic and social environment, and
medical impairment. I d at 1027. The Commission "failed . . . to carry out its task"
because it failed to apply the required criteria. IcL In other words, the Utah Supreme
Court criticized the Commission in Norton for doing the same thing that the Labor
Commission did in the instant case: failing to set forth and apply the proper factors. I d
The Labor Commission never applied the statutory criteria. As the court stated in Norton,
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"[n]o mention was made of [the] factors." Id. As a result, the Labor Commission's Order
must be vacated.
In short, the statute sets forth specific criteria for the Labor Commission to
consider and apply. The Labor Commission should have set forth each statutory criterion
and explained how each applied. The Labor Commission failed to do so in this case. As
a result, the Labor Commission's application of the rule impermissibly expanded the
statute in this case, and therefore the Labor Commission's order must be overturned.
3.

Case law holds that administrative rules, which purport to
define statutory terms, impermissibly modify the statute
requiring invalidation of the administrative rules

The Labor Commission claims that the administrative rule is simply an attempt to
define what constitutes "other work reasonably available." (R. 0201, stating that the
administrative rule was promulgated "for determining whether other work was
'reasonably' available within the meaning of [the statute].") However, other cases have
held that administrative rules which purport to define statutory terms have impermissibly
modified the statute requiring invalidation of the administrative rules. These cases,
applied to the instant case, require invalidation of this administrative rule.
In Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Audit Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, the Utah
Supreme Court invalidated an administrative rule that improperly defined what
constituted a manufacturer entitled to a statutory tax exemption. Instead of setting forth a
and applying the statutory criteria, the "Commission relied upon an administrative rule
that impermissibly narrowed the availability of the exemptions." Id. at 1304. The statute
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at issue in Sanders provided tax exemptions for manufacturers, and the petitioner was a
company that harvested and processed brine shrimp cysts. I d at 1304-05. The Tax
Commission refused to permit the exemption, concluding that the company "did not
satisfy [the administrative rule's] requirement that a manufacturer produce a new,
reconditioned, or remanufactured product. . . from raw, semi-finished, or used material."
Id. at 1305 (internal quotes and brackets omitted). In other words, the Tax Commission
purported to define what constituted a manufacturer - the statutory term. The Utah
Supreme Court held that the purported definition improperly restricted the statutory term.
Id. at 1305. The statute set forth some terms for defining a manufacturer. I d at 1306.
The administrative rule, however, went on to attempt to even further define a
manufacturer, by adding administrative definitions for which there were "no statutory
counterparts." I d This attempt to further define a statutory term resulted in improperly
restricting the sales tax exemption. I d This administrative definition impermissibly
modified the statute which required reversal of the administrative agency's decision. I d
In Draughon v. Dep't of Financial Institutions. 1999 UT App 42, 975 P.2d 935,
this Court invalidated yet another administrative agency's attempt to re-characterize a
statutory criterion with an administrative rule definition. In Draughon a civil service
worker was "involuntarily reassigned" (the administrative rule's terminology), pursuant to
an administrative rule permitting "involuntary reassignments" that could better utilize
workers' skills - the employer's stated reason for the reassignment. Id. at ^[1. The worker
was given the same pay initially, but subjected to less overall pay over time, and less
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retirement benefits, id. at Iffl 2, 10. The worker claimed that this "involuntary
reassignment" violated the statutory prohibition against "demotions." Demotion of a civil
service worker was prohibited by statute - unless good cause was shown. Id. at ^[5. This
Court explained that "[a]n administrative agency's authority to promulgate regulations is
limited to those regulations which are consonant with the statutory framework and neither
contrary to the statute nor beyond its scope." Id The Court then explained that the
Legislature "plainly set forth two situations in which a career service employee can be
demoted or dismissed [(good cause or to advance the good of the public service)]." Id at
U 8. The administrative rule, however, enlarged the statute by purporting to create new
administrative criteria for transferring a worker: an "involuntary reassignment." The
Court held that the rule was invalid because it contravened the Legislature.
Applying Sanders and Draughon to the instant case, the Labor Commission's rule
impermissibly modifies the statutory criteria for determining what constitutes other work
reasonably available. In the instant case, the statute was modified similar to how the Tax
Commission improperly restricted a statutory term by attempting to define it in Sanders or
how the Department of Human Resources management attempted to redefine the statutory
term in Draughon; the Labor Commission improperly enlarged the statutory term by
attempting to further define it. The statutory term that must be considered is what
constitutes "other work reasonably available," and the permitted criteria for considering
this term include "age, education, past work experience, medical capacity, and residual
functional capacity. The administrative rule expands the statutory criteria by purporting
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to permit the consideration of gross income, current available wage rates, or the current
state average weekly wage in considering what constitutes "other work reasonably
available." This administrative rule enlarges the criteria and thereby improperly modifies
the statute. Clearly the administrative rule and the statute are not congruent. As a result,
the Commission's ruling must be reversed.
Other jurisdictions support this reasoning. In Ney v. State Workmen's
Compensation Commissioner, 297 S.E.2d 212 (W. Va. 1982), an administrative rule was
invalidated because it modified statutory criteria. In Ney, the worker's compensation
statute provided that injured workers were entitled to reimbursement of transportation
expenses necessarily incurred in obtaining medical treatment. I d at 214-16. The
administrative rule attempted to more narrowly define the scope of travel, purporting to
permit reimbursement of travel expenses only if the travel exceeded twenty-five miles.
I d at 214-15. The administrative rule was invalidated as being "out of harmony" with the
statute by limiting the criteria for travel expense reimbursement. I d at 214; see also, e.g..
Holt Service Co. v. Modlin, 293 S.E.2d 741 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that
administrative rule that purported to shift the burden of proof in workers' compensation
proceedings was an impermissible extension of authority and contrary to the statutory
powers of the agency).
The administrative rule at issue in the instant case similarly purports to modify the
statutory criteria. Administrative Rule R612-1 -10.D. 1.1 .c.( 1) & (2) purports to expand
the criteria for consideration by the Labor Commission to include gross income, current
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wage rates, and the current state average weekly wage (as well as commuting distance
and steadiness of potential work). The rule must be invalidated and the decision of the
Labor Commission reversed.
4.

Other subsections of Administrative Rule R612-1-10 have been
declared invalid

This case would not be the first time that a portion of Administrative Rule R612-110 had to be declared invalid by this Court. In Target Trucking v. Labor Commission.
this Court reiterated that an administrative body's rules must conform to, rather than be
inconsistent with, statute. 2005 UT App 70,1}6, 108 P.3d 128. In Target Trucking, this
Court addressed whether Utah Administrative Rule 612-1 -10.C. 1 x, which purported to
state that a preliminary determination of permanent total disability was a final agency
action for purposes of appellate review, conflicted with the statutory rule that a finding of
permanent total disability was not final unless agreed to by the parties or until a
reemployment plan was prepared and considered by the Commission. Id. at ^ 3-6.
Because the administrative rule conflicted with the statute, this Court invalidated
Administrative Rule R612-1-10 (C)(1)(c), stating, "[t]he rule must, therefore, yield to the
statute." Id. In reaching this conclusion, this Court reiterated that administrative rules
"must conform to, rather than be inconsistent, with statute." I d at f6. For the reasons
explained in detail above, other portions of this same administrative rule, the provisions
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found in subsection R612-1-10.D., are also inconsistent with the statute and must be
invalidated.3
In sum, as outlined above, an administrative agency may not "abridge, enlarge,
extend or modify a statute." Draughon, 975 P.2d at 937. However, through promulgation
of Utah Administrative Rule 612-1-1 O.D.I, the Labor Commission made a significant
modification to the Workers' Compensation Act. The administrative rule is an
impermissible substantive amendment which goes well beyond the scope of the statute.
The administrative rule changes the basic requirements set by the Utah Legislature for a
finding of permanent total disability. Such a change may be made only by the Legislature
and is beyond the scope of the rule-making powers of the Labor Commission. As such,
the administrative rule must be invalidated pursuant to established principles of Utah
administrative law and the Commission's finding of permanent total disability reversed.
See Crowther, 762 P.2d at 1122.

3

In relying on Target Trucking, Petitioners acknowledge that the case of
Ameritemps, Inc. v. Labor Comm'n, 2005 UT App 491, 128 P.3d 31, noted a
disagreement with the Target Trucking opinion. Specifically, Ameritemps noted that
while Target Trucking was correct in the general rule requiring the invalidation of an
administrative rule that conflicts with legislation, the Target Trucking opinion failed to
apply the three-part test adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in Union Pac. R.R. Co. v.
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2000 UT 40, f 16, 999 P.2d 17, to determine when an agency
action is final. Regardless of any confusion as to the standard for determining whether an
agency action is final, the specific holding of Target Trucking remains clear: the
administrative rule in Target Trucking was properly invalidated because administrative
rules must conform to, rather than be inconsistent with statutes, and when an
administrative rule conflicts with a statute, the rule must yield to the statute.
25

C.

The Labor Commission's application of the Administrative Rule is
inconsistent, results in inefficient adjudication, and is contrary to the
statutory purpose of returning workers to the workforce.

The Labor Commission's application of the Rule also results in inefficient use of
administrative resources, and it runs contrary to the statutory purpose of returning
workers to the workforce.
The inconsistent and inefficient application of the rule is evidenced by the fact that
the Labor Commission applied the Rule to the first step of the two-part test for
determining whether an applicant is permanently totally disabled. By refusing to consider
jobs paying a wage less than the current state average weekly wage in the initial finding
stage, only to subsequently consider those same jobs in a subsequent hearing, the Labor
Commission's application of the rule results in inefficient, wasteful use of administrative
resources.
In Thomas v. Color Country Management, 2004 UT 12, 84 P.3d 1201, the Utah
Supreme Court explained the process for determining whether an employee is entitled to
permanent total disability compensation. Id, at ^[20-23. The court explained that the
process "requires that a finding be issued in two parts - an initial finding and a final
finding." Id. at f 21. The initial finding triggers a review period, and after this initial
finding the employer may submit a reemployment plan to be reviewed. A final finding of
permanent total disability is held in reserve until the possibilities of reemployment are
exhausted or abandoned. Id.
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The Labor Commission applies Administrative Rule R612-1-10 to the initial
finding stage, rejecting jobs presented by defendants that pay wages less than the current
state average weekly wage. However, in the second part of the process, the Commission
considers those same jobs that were deemed improper under the Administrative Rule.
This approach not only applies a Rule that conflicts with the statute, but results in
inefficient, wasteful use of administrative resources. The ALJ admonished defendants
about this two-step process and suggested that "[pjerhaps Mr. Evertson" had identified
these jobs that paid wages less than the state average weekly wage as part of a stage two
"reemploymnet plan." (R. 0046.) In other words, the ALJ suggested that the presentation
of available jobs at wages less than the state average weekly wage was improper for a
stage one determination, but proper for a stage two determination. Such a process is
inconsistent with the statute and results in inefficient adjudication.
This inconsistent and inefficient adjudication by the Labor Commission
demonstrates that the Administrative Rule is not in harmony with the overall
administrative process. Utah Code Section 34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv) states that to establish
that an employee is permanently totally disabled, the employee must prove that "the
employee cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking into consideration the
employee's age, education, past work experience, medical capacity, and residual
functional capacity." Subsection (6)(a) then states, "a finding by the Commission of
permanent total disability is not final, unless otherwise agreed to by the parties, until: (i)
an administrative law judge reviews a summary of reemployment activities undertaken
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pursuant to Chapter 8, Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act." IcL Application of the
administrative rule reveals additional problems with the rule and an additional conflict
with the statutory scheme. If the finding of permanent total disability cannot become
final until after a review of the reemployment plan, it makes no sense to apply the
Administrative Rule to the first step of the process, the tentative finding of permanent
total disability, and reject potential gainful employment because it pays too little, only to
turn around in the second step of the process to consider the very same potential gainful
employment that was previously rejected. Given the fact that the Labor Code should be
interpreted in favor of returning workers to the workforce as soon as possible, available
employment should be introduced and considered by the Commission at the first hearing,
irrespective of the amount of wages or other impermissible non-statutory factors, and the
Labor Commission should set forth and apply only the statutory criteria mandated by the
Legislature.
At least one Administrative Law Judge has acknowledged this inconsistency in
Trov Carter v. EOTT Energy Operation LTD, Case Nos. 99522 and 99523 (See
Addendum E.) The ALJ in Troy Carter stated the following:
The definition of "other work reasonably available" contained
in the Commission's rule does not apply to the evaluation of
"gainful employment." The evaluation of "other work
reasonably available" is part of the first step analysis of
whether a person is preliminarily permanently totally
disabled. "Gainful employment" is the standard to be applied
in second step proceedings to evaluate possible rehabilitation.
There is nothing in the wording of the statute or rule which
ties these terms together in a way that would require similar
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definitions or analysis. That being said, the undersigned
acknowledges the result could be reviewed as inconsistent. A
job offered as "other work reasonably available" in the first
step proceedings may not pay enough to meet the rule
requirement and, in part, lead to a tentative finding of
permanent total disability. Then, in the second step
proceedings, that same job could be offered as "gainful
employment" in a reemployment plan and the employee could
be required to accept it, assuming it was vocationally
appropriate."
Troy Carter Order at 3, Addendum E.
Refusing to consider gainful employment in the first stage simply because it pays
less than the current state average weekly wage is also contrary to the purpose of the
Worker's Compensation Act - to return citizens to the workforce. Utah Code Section
34A-2-413(6) states that a finding of permanent total disability is not final until an
administrative law judge reviews a summary of reemployment activities undertaken
pursuant to Chapter 8, Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act. Utah Administrative
Rule 612-1-1 O.D.I is in direct conflict with the purpose and provisions of the Utah
Injured Worker Reemployment Act. Utah Code Section 34A-8-102 states that the Utah
Injured Worker Reemployment Act "is intended to promote and . . . assist the injured
worker in returning to the work force as quickly as possible." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-8102 (1997). The administrative rule is contrary to this purpose.
Pursuant to the Reemployment Act, the evidence presented in the instant case
demonstrated that McGee is capable of gainful employment. As outlined above, the
express purpose of the Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act is to promote the return
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of injured workers to work. If Utah Administrative Rule 612-1-1 O.D.I is enforced as
written, to eliminate from consideration jobs that are beneath the state weekly average
wage for workers like McGee, it will significantly undermine the purpose and efficacy of
the Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act to return workers who are capable of
working to the workforce. Nothing in that statute requires an employer to provide
employment at the state average weekly wage or any other specific wage amount. Rather,
the statute seeks to return injured workers to the work force as quickly as possible. The
administrative rule is, thus, contrary to the purpose of the Reemployment Act and must be
stricken according to Utah law.
CONCLUSION
Instead of applying the statutory standard found in Utah Code Section 34A-2413(c)(iv) which sets forth statutory criteria that must be analyzed and applied in
evaluating whether an employee is permanently disabled, the Labor Commission applied
Utah Administrative Rule R612-1-1 O.D.I.c. This Administrative Rule purports to permit
consideration of factors beyond the statutory factors, and therefore conflicts with the
statutory standard. The Administrative Rule must be invalidated because it goes beyond
the statutory mandate.
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Accordingly, the Labor Commission's determination of permanent total disability
must be reversed. Additionally, the Utah Administrative Rule R612-1-1 O.D.I must be
declared invalid as an impermissible amendment to the Workers' Compensation Act.

DATED this Z?0 day of
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Addendum A
Statutes and Rules

34A.2-413

UTAH LABOR CODE

416

the Tstesmber, This Subsection 15) does not apply to the items
(2) }?Drpermanent total disability compensation during th
listed i „ Subsection (4)(b)(iv).
initial 312-week entitlement, compensation shall be 66-%% f
(6)
the employee's average weekly wage at the time of the iniurv
(a) For any permanent impairment caused by an indus- limited s follows:
^
a
trial accident t h a t is not otherwise provided for in the
(&) compensation per week may not be more than 85?
schedule of losses in this section, permanent partial
°f the state average weekly wage at the time of the injurydisability compensation shall be awarded by the commis(b) compensation per week may not be less than ft
sion based on the medical evidence.
per week, plus $5 for a dependent spouse, pl^
(b) Compensation for any impairment described in
$5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years u
Subsection (6)(a) shall, as closely as possible, be proport° ^ maximum of four dependent minor children, but nor
tionate to the specific losses in the schedule set forth in
exceeding the maximum established in Subsection (2Xa)
this section.
no
* exceeding the average weekly wage of the employee at
(c) Permanent partial disability compensation may
th§ time of the injury; and
^ot:
(c) after the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weeklv
(i) exceed 312 weeks, which shall be considered the
cot
*ipensation rate under Subsection (2Kb) shall be 36% of
period of compensation for permanent total loss of
ths current state average weekly wage, rounded to the
bodily function; and
nearest dollar.
(ii) be paid for any permanent impairment that
(3) F o r
existed prior to an industrial accident.
claims resulting from an accident or disease arisina
(?) The amounts specified in this section are all subject to out of ^ d j the course of the employee's employment on or
n
the limitations as to the maximum weekly amount payable as before < l u n e 3 0 ) 1994:
speci§ e ( j m this section, and in no event shall more than a
(fc) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for
maximum 0 f 66-%% of the state average weekly wage at the
ths initial 312 weeks of permanent total disability comtime t>f the injury for a total of 312 weeks in compensation be
pensation except as outlined in Section 34A-2-703 as in
requi> e d to be paid.
1997
effect on the date of injury.
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be
34A-£.4i3. P e r m a n e n t total disability — Amount of
required to pay compensation for any combination of
payments
—
Rehabilitation,
^abilities
of any kind, as provided in this section and
(1) (a) In cases of permanent total disability resulting from
Sections 34A-2-410 through 34A-2-412 and Sections 34A°h industrial accident or occupational disease, the em2-5ni through 34A-2-507 in excess of the amount of
ployee shall receive compensation as outlined in this
compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the
section.
applicable permanent total disability compensation rate
(b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disabilun
<)er Subsection (2).
^ y compensation, the employee has the burden of proof to
[ty Any overpayment of this compensation shall be
s
rei
*tow by a preponderance of evidence that:
*nbursed to the employer or its insurance carrier by the
(i) the employee sustained a significant impairEmployers' Reinsurance Fund and shall be paid out of the
ment or combination of impairments as a result of the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund's liability to the employee,
industrial accident or occupational disease that gives
(fl) After an employee has received compensation from
rise to the permanent total disability entitlement;
t n e employee's employer, its insurance carrier, or the
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled;
Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination d
and
disutilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at
tne
(iii) the industrial accident or occupational disease
applicable permanent total disability compensation
T a
was the direct cause of the employee's permanent
\ the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall pay all
total disability.
r e g a i n i n g permanent total disability compensation.
(c) l b find an employee permanently totally disabled,
(§) Employers' Reinsurance Fund payments shall com*
me
fc^e commission shall conclude that:
h c e immediately after the employer or its insurant
car
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed;
r i e r has satisfied its liability under Subsection (3) or
(ii) the employee has an impairment or combinaSection 34A-2-703.
(4) F ^ r claims resulting from an accident or disease arising
tion of impairments that limit the employee's ability
out of a^d i n the course of the employee's employment on or
to do basic work activities;
(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused im- after J\\\y 1? 1 9 9 4 :
(h) The employer or its insurance earner is liable fcr
pairment or combination of impairments prevent the
P e r m a n e n t total disability compensation.
employee from performing the essential functions of
(t>) The employer or its insurance carrier may not
the work activities for which the employee has been
re<
ftiired to pay compensation for any combination
qualified until the time of the industrial accident or
disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section a»
occupational disease that is the basis for the employSections 34A-2-410 through 34A-2-412 and Sections***
ee's permanent total disability claim; and
2-5<H through 34A-2-507, in excess of the a ^ J V
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reacompensation payable over the initial 312 weeks tf
sonably available, taking into consideration the ema
PPlicable permanent total disability compensation
ployee's age, education, past work experience, mediunc
W Subsection (2).
^ g be
cal capacity, and residual functional capacity.
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation sna« ^
(d) Evidence of an employee's entitlement to disability
De
recouped by the employer or its msurance c a r r ^
nefits other than those provided under this chapter and
rea
^onably offsetting the overpayment again*
•
Chapter 3, U t a h Occupational Disease Act, if relevant,
"ability paid before or after the initial 312 ! ^ . ^ J
m
ky be presented to the commission, but is not binding
(5) Notwithstanding the minimum rate estabbsbea
j
an
d creates no presumption of an entitlement under this
section ( 2 ) , the compensation payable by the emp J ^
cn
a p t e r and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act.
i n s u r a n t carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance vv»
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m ployee has received compensation from the employer or
thp en^P^y^'8 insurance carrier for any combination of dish'liti^s amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the
i-c^ble total disability compensation rate, shall be reduced,
t the extent allowable by law, by the dollar amount of 50% of
th Sdc^ Security retirement benefits received by the emduring VJftfe s>«r&fe pet\wL
ployee
(6) (a) A finding by the commission of permanent total
^usability is not final, unless otherwise agreed to by the
parties, until:
(i) an administrative law judge reviews a summary of reemployment activities undertaken pursuant to Chapter 8, Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act;
(ii) the employer or its insurance carrier submits
to the administrative law judge a reemployment plan
as prepared by a qualified rehabilitation provider
reasonably designed to return the employee to gainful employment or the employer or its insurance
carrier provides the administrative law judge notice
that the employer or its insurance carrier will not
submit a plan; and
(iii) the administrative law judge, after notice to
the parties, holds a hearing, unless otherwise stipulated, to consider evidence regarding rehabilitation
and to review any reemployment plan submitted by
the employer or its insurance carrier under Subsection (6)(a)(ii).
(b) Prior to the finding becoming final, the administrative law judge shall order:
(i) the initiation of permanent total disability compensation payments to provide for the employee's
subsistence; ana
(ii) the payment of any undisputed disability or
medical benefits due the employee.
(c) The employei or its insurance carrier shall be given
credit for any disability payments made under Subsection
(6Xb) against its ultimate disability compensation liability under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational
Disease Act.
(d) An employer or its insurance carrier may not be
ordered to submit a reemployment plan. If the employer
«r its insurance carrier voluntarily submits a plan, the
Plan is subject to Subsections (6)(d)(i) through (iii).
(i) The plan may include retraining, education,
medical and disability compensation benefits, job
placement services, or incentives calculated to facilitate reemployment funded by the employer or its
Wirance carrier.
ui) The plan shall include payment of reasonable
disability compensation to provide for the employee's
£J"kknce
during the rehabilitation process.
fa. T^ie employer or its insurance carrier shall
fljligently pursue the reemployment plan. The ernrlJfoyer'
e's or insurance carrier's failure to diligently
"S *? e 1 [ e e i n P l o y m e n t plan shall be cause for the
^" native law judge on the administrative law
own motion to make a final decision of perma«>tal disability
5 P v ep K °- n . derance o f t h e evidence shows that
rehabilitation is not possible, the administra-

tf Pern S h a 1 1 ° r d e r t h a t t h e e m P l o y e e b e Paid
^ t e ^ n H n t tetal dfe^Hity compensation benefits.
r e e W ° f b e n e f i t s commences on the date the
W a 2 Vei?naiimtly
totally disabled, as deterer
~" t*nA*
°f the commission based on the
Mad
i
S ^
and ends:
- * * d e a t * of the employee; or
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(ii) when the employee is capable of returning to
regular, steady work,
(p) An employer or its insurance carrier may provide or
locate for a permanently totally disabled employee reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time work in a job
earning at least minimum wage provided that employdisflualify the employee from Social Security disability
benefits.
(c) An employee shall fully cooperate in the placement
and employment process and accept the reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time work.
(d) In a consecutive four-week period when an employee's gross income from the work provided under Subsection (7Kb) exceeds $500, the employer or insurance carrier
may reduce the employee's permanent total disability
compensation by 50% of the employee's income in excess
of $500.
(e) If a work opportunity is not provided by the employer or its insurance carrier, a permanently totally
disabled employee may obtain medically appropriate,
part-time work subject to the offset provisions contained
in Subsection (7)(d).
(f) (i) The commission shall establish rules regarding
the part-time work and offset.
(ii) The adjudication of disputes arising under
Subsection (7) is governed by Part 8, Adjudication.
(£) The employer or its insurance carrier shall have the
burden of proof to show that medically appropriate parttime work is available.
fti) The administrative law judge may:
(i) excuse an employee from participation in any job
t\ia*i "womu Teqmre Vne emp\oyee "to xmaerteuie work
exceeding the employee's medical capacity and residual
functional capacity or for good cause; or
(ii) allow the employer or its insurance carrier to reduce permanent total disability benefits as provided in
Subsection (7)(d) when reasonable, medically appropriate,
part-time employment has been offered but the employee
has failed 1 o fully cooperate.
(8) When an employee has been rehabilitated or the employee's rehabilitation is possible but the employee has some
loss of bodily function, the siward shall be for permanent
partial disability.
(9) As determined by an administrative law judge, an
employee is not entitled to disability compensation, unless the
employee fully cooperates with any evaluation or reemployment plan under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational
Disease Act. The administrative law judge shall dismiss
without prejudice the claim for benefits of an employee if the
administrative law judge finds that the employee fails to fully
cooperate, unless the administrative law judge states specific
findings on the record justifying dismissal with prejudice.
(10) (a) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use
of froth hands, both arms, both feet, both legs, both eyes,
or any combination of two such body members constitutes
total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to this section.
Subsection (10)(a) is final.
(11) (a) An insurer or self-insured employer may periodically reexamine a permanent total disability claim, except
those based on Subsection (10), for which the insurer or
self-insured employer had or has payment responsibility
to determine whether the worker remains permanently
totally disabled.
(b) Reexamination may be conducted no more than
once every three years after an award is final, Unless good
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cause is shown by the employer or its insurance carrier to
allow more frequent reexaminations.
(c) The reexamination may include:
(i) the review of medical records;
(ii) employee submission to reasonable medical
evaluations;
(iii) employee submission to reasonable rehabilitation evaluations and retraining efforts;
(iv) employee disclosure of Federal Income Tax
Returns;
(v) employee certification of compliance with Section 34A-2-110; and
(vi) employee completion of sworn affidavits or
questionnaires approved by the division.
(d) The insurer or self-insured employer shall pay for
the cost of a reexamination with appropriate employee
reimbursement pursuant to rule for reasonable travel
allowance and per diem as well as reasonable expert
witness fees incurred by the employee in supporting the
employee's claim for permanent total disability benefits at
the time of reexamination.
(e) If an employee fails to fully cooperate in the reasonable reexamination of a permanent total disability finding, an administrative law judge may order the suspension of the employee's permanent total disability benefits
until the employee cooperates with the reexamination.
(f) (i) Should the reexamination of a permanent total
disability finding reveal evidence that reasonably
raises the issue of an employee's continued entitlement to permanent total disability compensation
benefits, an insurer or self-insured employer may
petition the Division of Adjudication for a rehearing
on that issue. The petition shall be accompanied by
documentation supporting the insurer's or self-insured employer's belief that the employee is no longer
permanently totally disabled.
(ii) If the petition under Subsection (ll)(f)(i) demonstrates good cause, as determined by the Division
of Adjudication, an administrative law judge shall
adjudicate the issue at a hearing.
(iii) Evidence of an employee's participation in
medically appropriate, part-time work may not be the
sole basis for termination of an employee's permanent
total disability entitlement, but the evidence of the
employee's participation in medically appropriate,
part-time work under Subsection (7) may be considered in the reexamination or hearing with other
evidence relating to the employee's status and condition.
(g) In accordance with Section 34A-1-309, the administrative law judge may award reasonable attorneys fees
to an attorney retained by an employee to represent the
employee's interests with respect to reexamination of the
permanent total disability finding, except if the employee
does not prevail, the attorneys fees shall be set at $1,000.
The attorneys fees shall be paid by the employer or its
insurance carrier in addition to the permanent total
disability compensation benefits due.
(h) During the period of reexamination or adjudication
if the employee fully cooperates, each insurer, self-insured
employer, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall continue to pay the permanent total disability compensation
benefits due the employee.
(12) If any provision of this section, or the application of any
provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the
remainder of this section shall be given effect without the
invalid provision or application.
1997
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34A-2-414. Benefits in case of death — Distribution
award to dependents — Death of dependent!
— Remarriage of surviving spouse.
(1) (a) The benefits in case of death shall be paid to one
more of the dependents of the decedent for the benefits
all the dependents, as may be determined by an adm'
istrative law judge.
(b) The administrative law judge may apportion th
benefits among the dependents in the manner that th
administrative law judge considers just and equitable
(c) Payment to a dependent subsequent in right mavbe
made, if the administrative law judge considers it proDer
and shall operate to discharge all other claims.
'
(2) The dependents, or persons to whom benefits are paid
shall apply the same to the use of the several beneficiaries
thereof in compliance with the finding and direction of the
administrative law judge.
(3) In all cases of death when:
(a) the dependents are a surviving spouse and one or
more minor children, it shall be sufficient for the surviving spouse to make application to the Division of Adjudication on behalf of that individual and the minor children;
and
(b) all of the dependents are minors, the application
shall be made by the guardian or next friend of the miner
dependents.
(4) The administrative law judge may, for the purpose of
protecting the rights and interests of any minor dependent!
the administrative law judge considers incapable of doing so,
provide a method of safeguarding any payments due the minor
dependents.
(5) Should any dependent of a deceased employee die during the period covered by weekly payments authorized by thif
section, the right of the deceased dependent to compensation
under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease
Act, shall cease.
(6) (a) If a surviving spouse, who is a dependent of 1
deceased employee and who is receiving the benefits of
this chapter or Chapter 3 remarries, that individual's sok
right after the remarriage to further payments of compensation shall be the right to receive in a lump sum w
lesser of:
(i) the balance of the weekly compensation pif
ments unpaid from the time of remarriage to theeul
of six years or 312 weeks from the date of the injur/
from which death resulted; or
^r,
(ii) an amount equal to 52 weeks of compenwo^
at the weekly compensation rate the surviving sp"""
was receiving at the time of such remarnage.
(b) (i) If there are other dependents remaining *«
time of remarriage, benefits payable under this
ter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational ^13eafJil
shall be paid to such person as an a d m i B l s t r ^ ^ |
judge may determine, for the use and benent ,
other dependents.
. <
(ii) The weekly benefits to be paid « » d * \ |
tion (6)(b)(i) shall be paid at intervals of not (
four weeks.
34A-2-415. Increase of award to children an
dent spouse — Effect of death, * * T £ #
jority, or termination of d e p e n d * * ^ dren — Death, divorce, or re?™
spouse.
0 fad3
If an award is made to, or increased because ^ ^
c
spouse or dependent minor child or ^
^ry^sseim
this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah OccupationaJJ-^ ^ $
award or increase in amount of the award s
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operated and monitored continuously with adequate maintenance, combustion, and water controls. The Division of Safety
may extend the inspection interval in writing when proper
evidence has been presented as to method of operation,
nerformance records, and water treatment.
(4) All low pressure boilers shall be internally and externally inspected at least biennially where construction will
permit For purposes of this Subsection (4), a "low pressure
boiler" is a boiler with steam 15 pounds per square inch
oressure and water 60 pounds per square inch pressure,
maximum.
(5) Boilers inspected by deputized inspectors employed by
msurance companies, if made within the time limits herein
provided, shall be considered to meet the provisions of this
part if
(a) reports of the inspections are filed with the Division
of Safety within 30 days after the inspection;
(b) the boilers are certified by the inspectors employed
by insurance companies as being safe to operate for the
purpose for which they are being used; and
(c) the inspection and filing of the report with the
Division of Safety shall exempt the boiler or boilers from
mspection fees provided for in this part.
(6) If a boiler shall, upon inspection, be found to be suitable
and to conform to the rules of the commission, the inspector
shall issue to such owner or user an inspection certificate.
(7) The Division of Safety may at any time suspend an
inspection certificate when in its opinion the boiler for which it
was issued may not continue to be operated without menace to
the public safety or when the boiler is found not to comply with
the safety rules of the commission. The suspension of an
mspection eeitificate shad continue in effect until the boiler
shall have been made to conform to the safety rules of the
commission and a new certificate is issued.
(8) Inspectors deputized or employed by the Division of
Safety under this part shall meet at all times nationally
recognized standards of qualifications of fitness and competence for such work.
1997
UM-104. Fees.
The owner or user of a boiler required by this part to be
inspected shall pay to the commission fees for inspection or for
Permits to operate in amounts set by the commission pursuant
» Section 63-38-3.2.
1997
**M-105. Violation of c h a p t e r — Misdemeanor — Injunction.
U) It is a violation of this part and a class C misdemeanor
°Pwate a boiler or pressure vessel subject to this part if:
UO certification has been denied or suspended; or
m\S
toiler or pressure vessel is knowingly operated

<^HrSf^ tuting a safety hazard-

*tiuag t e f 1 8 ^ ^ Safety may bring a lawsuit in any court
1
* * e i b v n t 0 - e m 0 m ^ e ° P e r a t i o n of any boiler or pressure

^B^ni-

° n °f t h i s part" T h e

c o u r t m a v i s s u e a tem

P°-

b
fcNfer^0n'wlthoUt
°nd, restraining further operation of
*• *<*t gh 1 « e 8 8 u r e v e s s e l , ex parte. Upon a proper showing,
%
l«*8»i»v p e 1 n n a n e n t l y enjoin the operation of the boiler
^** yessel until the violation is corrected.
1997
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34A-8-101. Title.
This chapter is known as the "Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act."
1997
34A-8-102. Intent statement.
This chapter is intended to promote and monitor the state's
and the employer's capacity to assist the injured worker in
returning to the work force as quickly as possible and to
evaluate the cost effectiveness of the program.
1997
34A-8-103. Chapter administration.
This chapter shall be administered by the commission in
conjunction with its administration of Chapters 2, Workers'
Compensation Act and 3, Utah .Occupational Disease Act.
1997

34A-8-104. Definitions.
(1) "Disabled injured worker" means an employee who:
(a) has sustained an industrial injury or occupational
disease for which benefits are provided under Chapter 2,
Workers' Compensation Act, or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act;
(b) because of the injury or disease;
(i) is or will be unable to return to work in the
injured worker's usual and customary occupation; or
(ii) is unable to perform work for which the injured
worker has previous training and experience; and
(c) reasonably can be expected to attain gainful employment after receiving the reemployment training and
benefits provided for in this chapter.
(2) "Division" means Division of Industrial Accidents.
(3) (a) "Gainful employment" means employment that:
(i) is reasonably attainable in view of the industrial injury or occupational disease; and
(ii) offers to the injured worker, as reasonably
feasible, an opportunity for earnings,
(b) Factors to be considered in determining gainful
employment include the injured worker's:
(i) education;
(ii) experience; and
(iii) physical and mental impairment and condition.
(4) "Parties" means:
(a) the disabled injured worker;
(b) employer;
(c) workers' compensation insurance carrier;
(d) reemployment coordinator; and
(e) other professionals as deemed necessary by the
commission.
(5) "Reemployment plan" means the written description or
rationale for the manner and means by which it is proposed a
disabled injured worker may be returned to gainful employment. The reemployment plan shall define the voluntary
responsibilities of the disabled injured worker, employer, and
other parties involved with the implementation of the plan.
1997
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34A-8-105. Reemployment coordinator — Duties.
The commissioner shall appoint a reemployment coordinator to assist in administering this chapter. The coordinator's
duties include:
(1) identifying and verifying, if necessary, the qualifications of all public or private reemployment or rehabilitation providers who render any medical or vocational
reemployment or rehabilitation services, including those
directly employed by an insurer, employer, or self-insurer;
(2) designing a study that will produce reliable data
from employers, insurance carriers, employees, and rehabilitation providers for cost effective recommendations to
carry out the intent of this chapter, the data shall include:
(a) the success rates of public and private rehabilitation and training programs in assisting in the
employment of the injured worker;
(b) the costs in providing such services; and
(c) the amount of time it takes to get the injured
worker into gainful employment;
(3) evaluating results to determine whether early identification of potential candidates for retraining results in
overall cost reduction and return of the injured worker to
gainful employment;
(4) assuring the contact and coordination of the employer or its workers' compensation insurance carrier and
the disabled injured worker to encourage the development
of evaluations and reemployment plans for the disabled
injured worker so that the completion of the plans can be
monitored by the commission;
(5) recommending procedures to avoid the duplication
of services provided by other state agencies or private
rehabilitation services, including registering the disabled
injured worker with the Division of Employment Development in the Department of Workforce Services for
reemployment; and
(6) perform other duties as may be prescribed by the
commission.
1997
34A-8-106. Initial report o n injured worker.
When it appears that an injured worker is or will be a
disabled injured worker, or when the period of the injured
worker's temporary total disability compensation period exceeds 90 days, whichever comes first, the employer or its
workers' compensation insurance carrier shall, within 30 days
thereafter, file with the division and serve on the injured
worker an initial written report assessing the injured worker's
need or lack of need for vocational assistance in reemployment. The employer or carrier shall also provide the injured
worker information regarding reemployment.
1997
34A-8-107. Evaluation of injured w o r k e r — Reemployment plan.
When it appears that an injured worker is a disabled
injured worker, the employer or its workers' compensation
insurance carrier shall within ten days of receiving the initial
report, unless otherwise authorized by the division, refer the
disabled injured worker to the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation or, at the employer's or insurance carrier's option to a
private rehabilitation or reemployment service, to provide an
evaluation and to develop a reemployment plan.
1997
34A-8-108. Reemployment objectives.
(1) The division shall administer this chapter with the
objective of assisting in returning the disabled injured worker
to gainful employment in the following order of employment
priority:
(a) same job, same employer;
(b) modified job, same employer;
(c) same job, new employer;
(d) modified job, new employer;
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(e) new job, new employer; or
(f) retraining in a new occupation.
(2) Nothing in this chapter or its application is intended to
(a) modify or in any way affect any existing employee.
employer relationship; or
(b) provide any employee with any guarantee or right
to employment or continued employment with any employer.
lw?
34A-8-109. Rehabilitation counselors and reemploy.
m e n t coordinator.
All rehabilitation counselors and the reemployment coordinator shall have the same pr comparable qualifications as
those established by the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation for
personnel assigned to rehabilitation and evaluation duties.
1897

34A-8-110. D u t i e s not affected.
The provisions of this chapter do not affect other duties and
responsibilities of the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation.
1997

34A-8-111. Rulemaking authority.
The commission may provide for the administration of this
chapter by rule in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah
Administrative Rulemaking Act.
1997
34A-8-112. Administrative review.
The employer and the injured worker may apply to the
Division of Adjudication for resolution of any issue of law or
fact arising under this chapter in accordance with Title 63,
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act.
1997
34A-8-113. Effective date — Application.
This chapter is effective July 1, 1990, and it applies only to
industrial injuries and occupational diseases which occur on
or after that date.
1997

TITLE 35
LABOR — INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
[RENUMBERED AND REPEALED]
TITLE 35A
UTAH WORKFORCE SERVICES CODE
Chapter
1. Department of Workforce Services.
2. Regional Workforce Services Areas.
3. Employment Support Act.
4. Employment Security.
5. Training and Workforce Improvement Act.
6. Apprenticeship Act.
7. Centralized New Hire Registry Act.
CHAPTER 1
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES
Parti
General Provisions
Section
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35A-1-102.
35A-M03.
35A-1-104.

Title.
Definitions.
Department of Workforce Services
— Seal.
Department authority.
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R612-1-10. Permanent Total Disability.
A. This ride applies to claims for permanent total disability compensation under the Utah Workers'
Compensation Act.
1. Subsection B applies to permanent total disability claims arising from accident or disease prior to May 1,1995.
2. Subsection C applies to permanent total disability claims arising from accident or disease on or after May 1,
1995.
B. For claims arising from accident or disease on or after July 1,1988 and prior to May 1,1995, the Commission is
required under Section 34A-2-413, to make a finding of total disability as measured by the substance of the sequential
decision-making process of the Social Security Administration under Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations,
amended April 1, 1993. The use of the term "substance of the sequential decision-making process" is deemed to confer
some latitude on the Commission in exercising a degree of discretion in making its findings relative to permanent total
disability. The Commission does not interpret the code section to eliminate the requirement that a finding by the
Commission in permanent and total disability shall in all cases be tentative and not final until rehabilitation training
and/or evaluation has been accomplished.
1. In the event that the Social Security Administration or its designee has made, or is in the process of making, a
determination of disability under the foregoing process, the Commission may use this information in lieu of
instituting the process on its own behalf.
2. In evaluating industrial claims in which the injured worker has qualified for Social Security disability benefits,
the Commission will determine if a significant cause of the disability is the claimant's industrial accident or some
other unrelated cause or causes.
3. To make a tentative finding of permanent total disability the Commission incorporates the rules of disabilitydetermination in 20 CFR 404.1520, amended April 1,1993. The sequential decision making process referred to
requires a series of questions and evaluations to be made in sequence. In short, these are:
a. Is the claimant engaged in a substantial gainful activity?
b. Does the claimant have a medically severe impairment?
c. Does the severe impairment meet or equal the duration requirement in 20 CFR 404.1509, amended April 1,
1993, and the listed impairments in 20 CFR Subpart P Appendix 1, amended April 1,1993?
d. Does the impairment prevent the claimant from doing past relevant work?
e. Does the impairment prevent the claimant from doing any other work?
4. After the Commission has made a tentative finding of permanent total disability:
a. In those cases arising after July 1,1994, the Commission shall order initiation of payment of permanent total
disability compensation;
b. the Commission shall review a summary of reemployment activities undertaken pursuant to the Utah Injured
Worker Reemployment Act, as well as any qualified reemployment plan submitted by the employer or its insurance
carrier; and
c. unless otherwise stipulated, the Commission shall hold a hearing to consider the possibility of rehabilitation
and reemplov meiit of the claimant pending final adjudication of the claim.
5. After a hearing, or waiver of the hearing by the parties, the Commission shall issue an order finding or denying
permanent total disability based upon the preponderance of the evidence and with due consideration of the vocational
factors in combination with the residual functional capacity which the commission incorporates as published in 20
CFR 404 Subpart P Appendix 2, amended April 1,1993.
C. For permanent total disability claims arising on or after May 1, 1995, Section 34A-2-413 requires a two-step
adjudicative process. First, the Commission must make a preliminary determination whether the applicant is
permanently and totally disabled. If so, the Commission will proceed to the second step, in which the Commission will
determine whether the applicant can be reemployed or rehabilitated.
1. First Step - Preliminary Determination of Permanent Total Disability: On receipt of an application for
permanent total disability compensation, the Adjudication Division will assign an Administrative Law Judge to
conduct evidentiary proceedings to determine whether the applicant's circumstances meet each of the elements set

forth in Subsections 34A-2-4i3(i)(b) and (c).
(a) If the ALT finds the applicant meets each of the elements set forth in Subsections 34A-2- 413(1)0) and (c), the
ALJ will issue a preliminary determination of permanent total disability and shall order the employer or insurance
carrier to pay permanent total disability compensation to the applicant pending completion of the second step of the
adjudication process. The payment of permanent total disability' compensation pursuant to a preliminary
determination shall commence as of the date established by the preliminary determination and shall continue until
otherwise ordered.
(b) A party dissatisfied with the ALJ's preliminary determination may obtain additional agency review by either
the Labor Commissioner or Appeals Board pursuant to Subsection 34A-2-8oi(3). If a timely motion for review of the
ALJ's preliminary determination is filed with either the Labor Commissioner or Appeals Board, no further
adjudicative or enforcement proceedings shall take place pending the decision of the Commissioner or Board.
(c) A preliminary determination of permanent total disability by the Labor Commissioner or Appeals Board is a
final agency action for purposes of appellate judicial review.
(d) Unless otherwise stayed by the Labor Commissioner, the Appeals Board or an appellate court, an appeal of the
Labor Commissioner or Appeals Board's preliminary determination of permanent total disability shall not delay the
commencement of "becond step" proceedings discussed below or payment of permanent total disability compensation
as ordered by the preliminary determination.
(e) The Commissioner or Appeals Board shall grant a request for stay if the requesting party has filed a petition
for judicial review and the Commissioner or Appeals Board determine that:
(i) the requesting party has a substantial possibility of prevailing on the merits;
(ii) the requesting party will suffer irreparable injury unless a stay is granted; and
(iii) the stay will not result in irreparable injury to other parties to the proceeding.
2. Second Step - Reemployment and Rehabilitation: Pursuant to Subsection 34A-2~413(6), if the first step of the
adjudicatory process results in a preliminary finding of permanent total disability, an additional inquiry must be made
into the applicant's ability to be reemployed or rehabilitated, unless the parties waive such additional proceedings.
(a) The ALJ will hold a hearing to consider whether the applicant can be reemployed or rehabilitated.
(i) As part of the hearing, the ALJ will review a summary of reemployment activities undertaken pursuant to the
Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act;
(ii) The employer or insurance carrier may submit a reemployment plan meeting the requirements set forth in
Subsection 34A-2-4i3(6)(a)(ii) and Subsections 34A-2-4i3(6)(d)(i) through (iii).
(b) Pursuant to Subsection 34A-2-4i3(4)(b) the employer or insurance earner may not be required to pay
disability compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind in excess of the amount of compensation
payable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total disability compensation rate.
(i) Any overpayment of disability compensation may be recouped by the employer or insurance carrier by
reasonably offsetting the overpayment against future liability paid before or after the initial 312 weeks.
(ii) An advance of disability compensation to provide for the employee's subsistence during the rehabilitation
process is subject to the provisions of Subsection 34A-2-4i3(4)(b), described in subsection 2.(b) above, but can be
funded by reasonably offsetting the advance of disability compensation against future liability normally paid after the
initial 312 weeks.
(iii) To fund an advance of disability compensation to provide for an employee's subsistence during the
rehabilitation process, a portion of the stream of future weekly disability compensation payments maybe discounted
from the future lo the present to accommodate payment. Should this be necessary, the employer or insurance carrier
shall be allowed to reasonably offset the amounts paid against future liability payable after the initial 312 weeks. In
this process, care should be exercised to reasonably minimize adverse financial impact on the employee.
(iv) In the event the parties cannot agree as to the reasonableness of any proposed offset, the matter may be
submitted to an AL1 for determination.
(c) Subsections 34A-2-4i3(7) and (9) require the applicant to fully cooperate in any evaluation or reemployment
plan. Failure to do so shall result in dismissal of the applicant's claim or reduction or elimination of benefit payments
including disabihty compensation and subsistence allowance amounts, consistent with the pro\ Lsions of Section 34A2-413(7) and (9).
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(d) Subsection 34A-2-4i3(6) requires the employer or its insurance carrier to diligently pursue any proffered
reemployment plan. Failure to do so shall result in a final award of permanent total disability compensation to the
applicant.
(e) If, after the conclusion of the foregoing "second step" proceeding, the ALJ concludes that successful
rehabilitation is not possible, the ALJ shall enter a final order for continuing payment of permanent total disability
compensation. The period for payment of such compensation shall be commence on the date the employee became
permanently and totally disabled, as determined by the ALJ.
(f) Alternatively, if after the conclusion of the "second step" proceeding, the ALJ concludes that successful
rehabilitation and/or reemployment is possible, the ALJ shall enter a final order to that effect, which order shall
contain such direction to the parties as the ALJ shall deem appropriate for successful implementation and
continuation of rehabilitation and/or reemployment. As necessary under the particular circumstances of each case,
the ALJ's final order shall provide for reasonable offset of payments of any disability compensation that constitute an
overpayment under Subsection 34A-2-4i3(4)(b).
(g) The ALJ's decision is subject to all administrative and judicial review provided by law-.
D. For purposes of this rule, the following standards and definitions apply:
1. Other work reasonably available: Subject to medical restrictions and other provisions of the Act and rules, other
work is reasonably available to a claimant if such work meets the following criteria:
a. The work is either within the distance that a resident of the claimant's community would consider to be a
typical or acceptable commuting distance, or is within the distance the claimant was traveling to work prior to his or
her accident;
b. The work is regular, steady, and readily available; and
c. The work provides a gross income at least equivalent to:
(1) The current state average weekly wage, if at the time of the accident the claimant was earning more than the
state average weekly wage then in effect; or
(2) The wage the claimant was earning at the time of the accident, if the employee was earning less than the state
average weekly wage then in effect.
2. Cooperation: As determined by an administrative law judge, an employee is not entitled to permanent total
disability compensation or subsistence benefits unless the employee fully cooperates with any evaluation or
reemployment plan. The ALJ will evaluate the cooperation of the employee using, but not limited to, the following
factors: attendance, active participation, effort, communication with the plan coordinator, and compliance with the
requirements of the vocational plan. In determining if these factors were met, the AU shall consider relevant changes
in the employee's documents medical condition.
3. Diligent Pursuit: The employer or its insurance carrier shall diligently pursue the reemployment plan. The ALJ
will evaluate the employer or insurance carrier's diligent pursuit of the plan using, but not limited to, the following
factors: timely payment of expenses and benefits outline in the vocational plan, and as required by the educational
institution providing the vocational training, communication with the employee, compliance with the requirements of
the vocational plan, and timely modification of the plan as required by documented changes in the employee's medical
condition.
4. Resolution of disputes regarding "cooperation" and "diligent pursuit": If a parly believes another party is not
cooperating with or diligently pursing either the evaluations necessary to establish a plan, or the requirements of an
approved reemployment or rehabilitation plan, the aggrieved party shall submit to the workers' compensation
mediation unit an outline of the specific instances of non-cooperation or lack of diligence. Other parties may submit a
reply. The Mediation Unit will promptly schedule mediation to reestablish cooperation among the parties necessary to
evaluate or comply with the plan. If mediation is unsuccessful, a party may request the Adjudication Division resolve
the dispute. The Adjudication Division will conduct a hearing on the matter within 30 days and shall issue a written
decision with 10 days thereafter.

Addendum B
"Order Affirming ALJ's Decision" dated December 28,2006

APPEALS BOARD
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
MICHAEL MCGEE,
Petitioner,
ORDER AFFIRMING
ALJ'S DECISION

vs.
LPI SERVICES and TRAVELERS
INSURANCE COMPANY,

Case No. 02-1225

Respondents.

LPI Services and its insurance carrier, Travelers Insurance Company (referred to jointly as
"LPI" hereafter), ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to review Administrative
Law Judge La Jeunesse's preliminary determination that Michael McGee is permanently and totally
disabled for purposes of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah
Code Annotated).
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated §63-46b-12 and §34A-2-801(3).
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED
Mr. McGee claims permanent total disability compensation for a low back injury he suffered
on July 4,2001, while working for LPI. After holding an evidentiary hearing on the claim, Judge La
Jeunesse concluded that Mr. McGee had satisfied the criteria of §413(l)of the Act and was,
therefore, entitled to a preliminary determination of permanent total disability.
Among the criteria for permanent total disability contained in §413(l)(c)(iv) is the
requirement that the injured worker "cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking into
account the employee's: (A) age; (B) education; (C) past work experience; (D) medical capacity;
and (E) residual functional capacity." In applying this standard to Mr. McGee's claim, Judge La
Jeunesse relied on the Commission's Rule 612-1-lO.D. 1 .c. to conclude that no work was reasonably
available to Mr. McGee.
In seeking review of Judge La Jeunesse's decision, LPI argues that the requirements of Rule
612-1 -10.D. 1 .c are contrary to the statutory provisions of § 413(1 )(c)(iv). Alternatively, LPI argues
that, even if Rule 612-1-lO.D.l.c is valid, it cannot be applied retroactively to Mr. McGee's claim.
FINDINGS OF FACT
LPI does not contest Judge La Jeunesse's findings of fact. The Appeals Board therefore
adopts those findings.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Compatibility of Rule 612-1-1 P.P. 1 .c with §413(1 )(c)(iv). In considering LPT s arguments,
the Appeals Board acknowledges the fundamental principle that administrative rules must comply
with statutory directives. In Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Audit Division, 846 P.2d 1304, 1306 (Utah
1993), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
It is a long-standing principle of administrative law that an agency's rules must be
consistent with its governing statutes. Thus, a rule that is out of harmony with a
governing statute is invalid. (Internal citations omitted.)
In this case, § 34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv) is the governing statute. It provides as follows (emphasis
added):
(c) To find an employee permanently totally disabled, the commission shall
conclude that:
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking into
consideration the employee's:
(A) age;
(B) education;
(C) past work experience;
(D) medical capacity;
(E) residual functional capacity.
The foregoing statute was enacted in 1995. Thereafter, stakeholders in the workers'
compensation system asked the Commission to promulgate standards for determining whether other
work was "reasonably" available within the meaning of § 413(l)(c)(iv). The Commission convened
an ad hoc committee with representatives from the applicants' bar, insurance carriers and employers.
The committee proposed what is now Rule 612-1 -10.D. 1 .c. The rule was discussed and approved by
the Workers' Compensation Advisory Council established by § 34A-2-107 of the Act, then
discussed at public hearings. The Commission promulgated the rule in January 200land it has
remained in effect since then. Rule 612-1-10.D.1 provides as follows:
1. Other work reasonably available: Subject to medical restrictions and other
provisions of the Act and rules, other work is reasonably available to a claimant if
such work meets the following criteria:
a. The work is either within the distance that a resident of the claimant's community
would consider to be a typical or acceptable commuting distance, or is within the
distance the claimant was traveling to work prior to his or her accident;
b. The work is regular, steady, and readily available; and
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c. The work provides a gross income at least equivalent to:
(1) The current state average weekly wage, if at the time of the accident the claimant
was earning more than the state average weekly wage then in effect; or
(2) The wage the claimant was earning at the time of the accident, if the employee
was earning less than the state average weekly wage then in effect.
LPI now contends that subsection (c) of Rule 612-1-1 O.D.I is invalid because it exceeds the
scope of § 413(l)(c)(iv). Section § 413(l)(c)(iv) requires the Commission to determine whether
other work is "reasonably available," taking into consideration, among other factors, the injured
worker's "past work experience." In effect, LPI argues that "past work experience" refers only to
the injured worker's duties at work, and not to any of the other terms and conditions of the work
environment. Thus, under LPI's interpretation, aspects of the injured worker's past employment such
as location, wage, or hours cannot be considered.
On the other hand, the Commission's Rule 612-1-10.D.1 takes a broader view of the
statutory term "past work experience." Under the rule, "past work experience" includes an injured
worker's job duties, but also includes other aspects of the employment contract. The rule therefore
takes into account the location of the injured worker's residence and past employment, previous
wage levels, and the availability and regularity of alternative work. The Appeals Board finds the
rule to be reasonable, consistent with the structure and purposes of the workers' compensation
system, and within the Commission's authority.
The Appeals Board notes LPI's argument that provisions of the Utah Injured Worker
Reemployment Act ("Reemployment Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 8, Utah Code Annotated) must be
considered in interpreting § 34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv)'s test of"other work reasonably available." While
it is true that § 34A-2-413 of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act makes passing reference to the
Reemployment Act, the Appeals Board finds no basis to conclude that the Legislature intended to
incorporate the various definitions of the Reemployment Act into § 413. But even if such an
incorporation were intended, § 34A-8-104(3) of the Reemployment Act itself defines "gainful
employment" in terms of work that is "reasonably feasible" and "reasonably attainable" in
consideration of the injured worker's past "experience." Thus, the Reemployment Act's statutory
formulation is only slightly different from that of § 34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv) and, for the reasons already
stated above, is not violated by the Commission's Rule 612-1-10.D.1.
Finally, LPI argues that Rule 612-1-10.D. 1 cannot be applied to claims based on injuries that
occurred before the rule was promulgated. However, it is § 413(l)(c)(iv), rather than Rule 612-110.D. 1, which gives rise to Mr. McGee's right to benefits. The rule does nothing more than explain
how the Commission will exercise the discretion conferred by § 413(l)(c)(iv), to determine whether
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other work is "reasonably" available to Mr. McGee. In light of the provisions of the underlying
statute and the function of the Commission's rule, the Appeals Board finds no reason why the rule
cannot be applied to Mr. McGee's claim.
In summary, the Appeals Board concludes that Rule 612-1-1 O.D.I is consistent with the
provisions of § 34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv). The Appeals Board further concludes that Judge La Jeunesse
properly applied the rule to Mr. McGee's claim.
ORDER
The Appeals Board affirms Judge La Jeunesse's decision. It is so ordered.
Dated this £% day of December, 2006.

Patricia S. Drawe

Joseph E. Hatch

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider this
Order. Any such request for reconsideration must be received by the Appeals Board within 20 days
of the date of this order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals
by filing a petition for review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the
court within 30 days of the date of this order.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Affirming ALJ's Decision in the matter of Wayne
McGee, Case No. 02-1225, was mailed first class postage prepaid this cffiaay of December, 2006,
to the following:
Wayne McGee
3186 Don Francisco Dr
Taylorsville UT 84118
LPI Services
200 E Randolph D
Vernal IL 60601
Richard Burke, Esq.
7390 S Creek Rd #104
Sandy UT 84093
Mark Sumsion, Esq.
50 S Main St Ste 700
P O Box 2465
Salt Lake City UT 84110

Sara Danielson
Utah Labor Commission
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
P.O. BOX 146615
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615
Case No. 20021225
*
*

MICHAEL MCGEE,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,

Petitioner,

AND ORDER

vs.

*

LPI SERVICES and/or TRAVELERS,
Judge: Richard M. La Jeunesse
Respondents,
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * **

HEARING:

Room 332, Labor Commission, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah,
on October 31, 2004 at 1:00 p.m. Said Hearing was pursuant to Order and
Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Richard M. La Jeunesse, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The petitioner, Michael McGee, was present and represented by his
attorney Richard R. Burke.
The respondents were represented by attorney Mark R. Sumsion.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The petitioner, Michael McGee, filed an "Application For Hearing" with the Utah Labor
Commission on November 4, 2002 and claimed entitlement to the following workers'
compensation benefits: (1) medical expenses; (2) recommended medical care; (3) temporary total
disability compensation, and; (4) permanent partial disability compensation. On August 8, 2003
Mr. McGee amended his Application for Hearing to include permanent total disability
compensation. Mr. McGee's claim for workers' compensation benefits arose out of an industrial
accident that occurred on July 4, 2001 while employed for LPI Services.
The respondents acknowledged that Mr. McGee injured his low back on July 4, 2001 while
employed for LPI Services (LPI). However, respondents maintained that they paid Mr. McGee
all workers compensation benefits owed to him. Respondents denied that the injuries sustained
by Mr. McGee on July 4, 2001 directly caused him to become permanently and totally disabled.
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II. ISSUE.
Did the injuries sustained by Michael McGee on July 4, 2001 directly cause him to become
permanently and totally disabled?
III. FINDINGS OF FACT
A.

Employment.

The parties agreed that Mr. McGee suffered an industrial accident on July 4, 2001 that arose out
of and in the course of his employment with LPI.
B.

Compensation Rate.

As of July 4, 2001 Mr. McGee was married with one dependent child. Mr. McGee's testimony
provided the sole, unrefuted evidence of his wages with LPI.. On July 4, 2001 Mr. McGee's
compensation with LPI equaled $17.50 per hour, 40 hours per week average, which yielded the
maximum permanent total disability compensation rate of $471.00 per week. [$17.50/hr x 40
hrs/week = $700.00/week x 2/3 = $467.00/week + $10.00/week = $477.00/week].
C.

The July 4, 2001 Industrial Accident.

Again, Mr. McGee's testimony supplied the unrefuted evidentiary account of his industrial
accident at LPI. Mr. McGee worked for 10 months as a building engineer for LPI. As LPFs
building engineer Mr. McGee maintained the building's boiler, HVAC,1 elevators, lights, and
plumbing.
While at work for LPI on July 4, 2001, Mr. McGee and three other employees attempted to
install a rebuilt air-handler motor that weighed about 600 pounds. The crew of four men lowered
by hand the 600 pound motor 13 inches from one level to the next. All of the men but Mr.
McGee let go of the motor and he bore the brunt of the motor's weight on his right shoulder. Mr.
McGee felt immediate, extreme pain in his right shoulder and low back.
Mr. McGee reported the July 4, 2001 industrial accident the same day to his immediate
supervisor at LPI, Helen Smith. Eventually, Mr. McGee's right shoulder problems resolved.
However, Mr. McGee continued to suffer low back pain from the date of the industrial accident
through the date of the hearing.

Seating, ventilation and air conditioning.
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In April of 2002 while engaged in physical therapy for his low back problems, Mr. McGee
developed persistent migraine headaches. At the time of the hearing Mr. McGee disclaimed that
his headaches caused the significant problems that kept him from working. Consequently, I gave
no further attention to Mr. McGee's headaches, or right shoulder problems.
D.

Michael McGee's Low Back Problems.
1.

Low Back Problems Prior to July 4,2001.

Mr. McGee acknowledged that he had some back problems that necessitated surgery prior to July
4, 2001. Dr. Robert Morrow M.D. diagnosed Mr. McGee with an "L5-S1 disc herniation."
[Exhibit "J-l" at 154]. On September 6, 1982 Dr. Morrow operated on Mr. McGee and
performed an "L5-S1 disc excision + foraminotomy." [id.].
An x-ray taken of Mr. McGee's lumbar spine on May 28, 1984 showed:
Heights of vertebral bodies and intervertebral spaces are normal with the
exception of a very slight decrease at the L-5/S-1 level, [id. at 169].
On October 5, 1984 Mr. McGee sought medical treatment for a "low back strain." [id. at 263]. In
sum, the undisputed evidence in this case established that prior to July 4, 2001, Mr. McGee
suffered a lumbar herniated disc at the L5-S1 level for which he underwent a discectomy and
foraminotomy on September 6, 1982.
2.

Low Back Problems Caused by Michael McGee's July 4,2001
Industrial Accident.

On October 31, 2001 Mr. McGee had a lumbar MRI scan that revealed:
IMPRESSION: Circumferential disk bulge in association with bilateral facet
hypertrophy and ligamentum flavum2 hypertrophy at L4-5 moderate to severely
narrows the neural foramina and moderate to severely narrows the bilateral
recesses. [Exhibit "J-l" at 146].

2

Ligaments that attach to the ventral portion of the vertebrae.
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On November 15, 2001 Dr. Charles Bova M.D. diagnosed Mr. McGee with:
IMPRESSION: Multilevel degenerative disk disease of the lumbar spine with disk
bulges at L3-4, 4-5, and S-l with foraminal stenosis at L4-5 right greater than left,
[id. at 8].
On January 29, 2002 Dr. Alan Brown M.D. concluded: "I think that this patient's primary pain
generator is at L4-5." [id. at 35]. Dr. Brown then commented on February 7, 2002:
I re-reviewed his x-rays and he has a lot of central foraminal stenosis, probably
right sided foraminal stenosis at L4-5. He has multilevel disc disease as well. [id.
at 218].
On February 25, 2002 Dr. Brown operated on Mr. McGee and performed:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Posterior spinal fusion L5.
Posterior interbody fusion L4-5.
Instrumentation L4-5 nonsegmental (Xia instrumentation).
Bone graft through separate incision, right iliac crest.
Placement of internal bone growth stimulator, [id. at 224],

On July 29, 2002 Dr. Richard Knoebel M.D. and Dr. Gerald Moress M.D. opined that Mr.
McGee suffered a 15% whole person impairment as a result of his low back problems, [id. at 95].
Dr. Knoebel and Dr. Moress determined preexisting conditions accounted for 10% of the whole
person impairment derived from Mr. McGee's low back problems, [id.]. Dr. Knoebel and Dr.
Moress found that Mr. McGee's industrial accident of July 4, 2001 caused the additional 5%
whole person impairment due to his low back problems, [id.]. Dr. Brown found that Mr.
McGee's low back problems created at least a 13% whole person impairment without
apportionment, [id. at 43-44].3
On February 10, 2003 Dr. Bova stated:
I am concerned, though that he has bulging at L-3/4 and5/l, the areas that were
not treated surgically, and these may be a source of residual pain. [id. at 19].

3

I did not bother to resolve the disparity between the 15% and 13% whole person
impairment ratings because the slight difference made no difference in the permanent total
disability analysis.
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The undisputed medical evidence in this case confirmed that after the industrial accident on July
4, 2001, Mr. McGee ended up with a previously undiagnosed herniated disc in his lumbar spine
at the L 4-5 level treated surgically by Dr. Brown. Mr. McGee also had some degenerative disc
disease at the L3-S1 levels of his lumbar spine. No dispute existed that Mr. McGee's industrial
accident on July 4, 2001 caused him low back problems that resulted in no less than An
additional 5% whole person impairment.
E.

Permanent Total Disability.
1.

Significant Impairment.

The medical evidence in this case established that Mr. McGee's low back problems resulted in at
least a 13% whole person impairment, [see: Section III.D.2.]. The medical evidence in this case
also verified that Mr. McGee's accident on July 4, 2001 necessitated surgery and caused no less
than 5% of his total whole person impairment, [id.]. Accordingly, Mr. McGee suffered a
significant impairment as a result of his industrial accident on July 4, 2001.
2*

Gainful Employment.

The unrefuted evidence in this case confirmed that Mr. McGee never worked again after being
released from the hospital for back surgery on February 28, 2002.
3.

Ability to do Basic Work Activities.

As set forth in Section III. E.l. Mr. McGee's low back problems resulted in at least a 13% whole
person impairment. On July 29, 2002 Dr. Knoebel and Dr. Moress stated that Mr. McGee's
impairments precluded him from medium heavy work. [Exhibit "J-1" at 95 see: also id. at 112A].
Dr. Knoebel and Dr. Moress set Mr. McGee's lifting capacity at 50 pounds on an occasional
basis and 25 pounds on a frequent basis. Dr. Knoebel and Dr. Moress also limited Mr. McGee's
activities with respect to bending, squatting, kneeling, climbing, twisting, pushing, pulling, etc
from occasional to frequent, [id. at 104]. Finally, Dr. Knoebel and Dr. Moress asserted that Mr.
McGee's condition warranted vocational rehabilitation, [id.].
On October 8, 2002 Dr. Brown opined that Mr. McGee should apply for "medical retirement."
[id. at 45]. Dr. Brown found that:
I do not think he is a good rehabilitation candidate given the symptoms that he is
currently having, [id.].
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After a year of treatment post-surgery, Dr. Brown on May 15, 2003 concluded:
My assessment is that Mr. McGee suffers from severe permanent physical
impairment and is presently unable to perform any substantial gainful
employment.
I do not think that he is going to be a candidate for vocational rehabilitation either.
I think that he is at maximum medical improvement and cannot really function for
more than two to three hours at a time without his pain becoming too much for
him to tolerate, [id. at 216].
On May 29, 2003 Dr. Bova in agreement with Dr. Brown asserted:
[M]ichael McGee, who sustained a back injury July 4, 2001... [sjuffers from
permanent physical impairments, and he is presently unable to perform any
substantial gainful activities.
Due to these conditions, I believe he is unable to physically tolerate sitting,
standing, or walking for no more that (sic) 30 minutes at this time. [id. at 217].
Del Felix PT performed a Functional Capacity Examination of Mr. McGee that concluded on
August 22, 2003. Mr. Felix found that Mr. McGee's functional tolerances included: (1) sitting
for 25-41 minutes; (2) static standing for 15 minutes; (3) dynamic standing for 45 minutes; (4)
walking for .89 miles, and; (5) climbing two flights of stairs, [id. at 114C]. Mr. Felix felt that
Mr. McGee's functional limitations put him in the "LIGHT Physical Demand Characteristics of
Work Level" according to the DOT. [id. at 114F]. Mr. Felix to some extent.challenged Mr.
McGee's effort, [id. at 113F].
In short, the consensus of medical opinion in this matter demonstrated that Mr. McGee's
impairments limited his ability to do basic work activities anywhere from not working at all to
limited sitting, standing lifting, walking, bending, squatting, kneeling, climbing, twisting,
pushing, pulling, in greater or lesser degrees according to the varying medical perspectives.
4.

Ability to Perform Essential Functions of the Work Activities for
which Michael McGee Qualified Prior to the Industrial Accident of
July 4, 2001.
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At 53 years old Mr. McGee's past work history consisted almost exclusively of building facility
maintenance and heavy equipment operator. Mr. McGee went to work for Kennecott Utah
Copper on September 22, 1969 as a millwright. Mr. McGee's duties at Kennecott as a
millwright involved machinery maintenance similar to his work at LPI. Mr. McGee also
engaged in the operation of heavy equipment at Kennecott.
On November 2, 1987 Ford, Bacon and Davis employed Mr. McGee as a building engineer and
heavy equipment operator. Mr. McGee's duties as a building engineer at Ford, Bacon and Davis
mirrored his duties at LPI.
On October 22, 1988 Mr. McGee went to work for Eastman Christensen again as a building
engineer. September 11, 1990 found Mr. McGee at Jerry Seiner as a building engineer. On July
5, 1995 Mr. McGee became the building engineer at Thatcher Chemical. Then on May 5, 1996
Mr. McGee moved to Evergreen Canyons again as a building engineer. On August 4, 2000
Jones Lang LaSalle employed Mr. McGee as a building engineer.
On June 13, 2002 Dr. Brown declared that Mr. McGee could not return to his former
employment. [Exhibit "J-l" at 42]. On September 5, 2002 Dr. Brown reasserted his
admonishment that Mr. McGee not return to his former line of work. [id. at 43]. On July 29,
2002 Dr. Knoebel and Dr. Moress proclaimed: "[fjrom a medical viewpoint the patient cannot
return to his usual and customary occupation...." [id. at 104].
The uniform medical opinion in this case verified that Mr. McGee medically lacked the ability to
perform the essential functions of his lifetime profession as a building engineer, nor return to his
usual line of work. Of note, Helen Smith told Mr. McGee that LPI did not want him back to
work with his physical limitations.
5.

Other Work Reasonably Available.

As found in Section III.E.3., the medical experts in this case placed limitations on Mr. McGee
that ranged from no work at all to light physical demand characteristics to medium demand work
characteristics. Both parties presented reemployment experts.
Mr. McGee provided the testimony of Kristy Famsworth PhD. who based her vocational
assessment of Mr. McGee on the medical restrictions set forth by Dr. Brown, Dr. Bova and Del
Felix's FCE. Dr. Farnsworth did not consider Dr. Knoeble's opinion. Based on the medical
opinions utilized by Dr. Farnsworth she predictably concluded that Mr. McGee was an unfit
candidate for either reemployment or vocational rehabilitation.
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The respondents advanced the testimony of Dirk Evertson a reemployment counselor who
conducted a four hour assessment of Mr. McGee. Mr. Evertson reviewed the medical opinions
of Dr. Brown, Dr. Bova, Del Felix, and Dr. Knoeble. As a vocational expert Mr. Evertson
decided that Mr. McGee appropriately belonged in the light physical demand characteristics of
work level according to the DOT4 of the U.S. Labor Department. Accordingly, the expert
vocational opinion in this case after a review of all the medical evidence placed Mr. McGee in no
greater than the light physical demand characteristics of work level according to the DOT.
Mr. Evertson then conducted a market survey that disclosed 30 job categories he thought
appropriate for Mr. McGee within his limitations. Mr. Evertson then spoke to four specific
employers from the job categories he identified. Mr. Evertson specifically identified two jobs he
considered suitable for Mr. McGee. The first job specified by Mr. Evertson was a job as a lens
stylist at Lenscrafters. The job at Lenscrafters only involved the handling of very small parts.
Employment at Lenscrafters allowed employees to accommodate frequent position changes, but
usually involved standing for 80%, and sitting for 20%, of the time in an eight hour day. The
job at Lenscrafters paid $7.00 per hour with commissions that Mr. Evertson calculated at $2.50
per hour or more. Mr. Evertson estimated that the maximum income at Lenscrafters with
commission amounted to between $12.00 to $13.00 per hour.
The second job designated by Mr. Evertson as appropriate for Mr. McGee was a position as car
rental reservationist. The car rental reservationist job allowed employees to sit, stand and walk
as they desired. The car rental reservationist position paid $7.29 per hour with commissions that
Mr. Evertson again approximated at $2.50 per hour or more. Mr. Evertson estimated that the
maximum income as a car rental reservationist with commission amounted to between $12.00 to
$13.00 per hour.
As set forth in Section III.B. Mr. McGee earned $17.50 per hour, 40 hours per week average, or
$700.00 per week while employed for LPI as of July 4, 2001. The average weekly wage for the
State of Utah as of July 4, 2001 equaled $554.00 per week, or $13.85 per hour. The two jobs
located by Mr. Evertson as lens stylist and car rental reservationist at most paid $13.00 per hour,
or less than the average weekly wage for the State of Utah as of July 4, 2001. Accordingly, no
evidence existed that any employment remained reasonably available to Mr. McGee as of the
date of the hearing pursuant to the requirements of Utah Code §34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv) and Utah
Administrative Code R. 612-1-lO.D.l.c.

dictionary of Occupational Titles.

00040

McGee v. LPI Services et al
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order
page 9

6.

Summary Concerning Permanent Total Disability.

Mr. McGee became permanently and totally disabled on February 28, 2002, after his July 4,
2001 industrial accident.
7.

Direct Cause of Michael McGee's Permanent Total Disability.

The preponderance of the evidence in this case confirmed that Mr. McGee's industrial accident
on July 4, 2001 served as the direct cause of his permanent total disability. Prior to the
additional lumbar spine injuries caused by his July 4, 2001 industrial, Mr. McGee remained
productively employed in his lifelong occupation as a building engineer.
IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A.

Employment.

Mr. McGee suffered an industrial accident on July 4, 2001 that arose out of and in the course of
his employment with LPI.
B.

Compensation Rate.

As of July 4, 2001 Mr. McGee was married with one dependent child. On July 4, 2001 Mr.
McGee's compensation with LPI equaled $17.50 per hour, 40 hours per week average, which
yielded the maximum permanent total disability compensation rate of $471.00 per week.
[$17.50/hr x 40 hrs/week = $700.00/week x 2/3 = $467.00/week + $10.00/week =
$477.00/week].
C.

The July 4,2001 Industrial Accident.

While at work for LPI on July 4, 2001, Mr. McGee and three other employees attempted to
install a rebuilt air-handler motor that weighed about 600 pounds. The crew of four men lowered
by hand the 600 pound motor 13 inches from one level to the next. All of the men but Mr.
McGee let go of the motor and he bore the brunt of the motor's weight on his right shoulder. Mr.
McGee felt immediate, extreme pain in his right shoulder and low back.
Mr. McGee reported the July 4, 2001 industrial accident the same day to his immediate
supervisor at LPI, Helen Smith. Eventually, Mr. McGee's right shoulder problems resolved.
However, Mr. McGee continued to suffer low back pain from the date of the industrial accident
through the date of the hearing.

00041

McGee v. LPI Services et al
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order
page 10
D.

Michael McGee's Low Back Problems.
1.

Low Back Problems Prior to July 4, 2001.

Prior to July 4, 2001, Mr. McGee suffered a lumbar herniated disc at the L5-S1 level for which
he underwent a discectomy and foraminotomy on September 6, 1982.
2.

Low Back Problems Caused by Michael McGee's July 4, 2001
Industrial Accident.

After the industrial accident on July 4, 2001, Mr. McGee ended up with a previously
undiagnosed herniated disc in his lumbar spine at the L 4-5 level treated surgically by Dr. Brown.
Mr. McGee also had some degenerative disc disease at the L3-S1 levels of his lumbar spine. Mr.
McGee's industrial accident on July 4, 2001 caused him low back problems that resulted in no
less than a 5% whole person impairment.
E.

Permanent Total Disability.

Utah Code §34A-2-413 (1) provides in pertinent part:
(a) In cases of permanent total disability resulting from an industrial accident or
occupational disease, the employee shall receive compensation as outlined in this
section:
(b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the
employee has the burden of proof to show by a preponderance of the evidence
that:
(i) The employee sustained a significant impairment or combination of
impairments as a result of the industrial accident or occupational disease
that gives rise to the permanent total disability entitlement;
(ii) The employee is permanently totally disabled; and
(iii) the industrial accident or occupational disease was the direct cause of
the employees permanent total disability.
(c) To find an employee permanently totally disabled, the commission shall conclude
that:
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed;
(ii) the employee has an impairment or combination of impairments that
limit the employee's ability to do basic work activities;

00042

McGee v. LPI Services et al
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order
page 11

(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused impairment or combination of
impairments prevent the employee from performing the essential functions of the
work activities for which the employee has been qualified until the time of the
industrial accident or occupational disease that is the basis of the employee's
permanent total disability claim; and
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available taking into
consideration the employee's age, education, past work experience,, medical
capacity, and residual functional capacity.
1.

Significant Impairment.

Mr. McGee's low back problems resulted in at least a 13% whole person impairment. Mr.
McGee's accident on July 4, 2001 necessitated surgery and caused no less than 5% of his total
whole person impairment. Accordingly, Mr. McGee suffered a significant impairment as a result
of his industrial accident on July 4, 2001.
2.

Gainful Employment.

Mr. McGee never worked again after being released from the hospital for back surgery on
February 28, 2002.
3.

Ability to do Basic Work Activities.

Mr. McGee's low back problems resulted in at least a 13% whole person impairment. Mr.
McGee's impairments limited his ability to do basic work activities anywhere from not working
at all to limited sitting, standing lifting, walking, bending, squatting, kneeling, climbing,
twisting, pushing, pulling, in greater or lesser degrees according to the varying medical
perspectives.
4.

Ability to Perform Essential Functions of the Work Activities for
which Michael McGee Qualified Prior to the Industrial Accident of
July 4,2001.

At 53 years old Mr. McGee's past work history consisted almost exclusively of building facility
maintenance and heavy equipment operator. Mr. McGee medically lacked the ability to perform
the essential functions of his lifetime profession as building engineer, nor return to his usual line
of work.
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5.

Other Work Reasonably Available.

Utah Administrative Code R. 612-1-lO.D.l. states in relevant part that:
Other work reasonably available: subject to the medical restrictions and other
provisions of the Act and rules, other work is reasonably available to a claimant if
such work meets the following criteria:
c. The work provides a gross income at least equivalent to:
(1.) The current state average weekly wage, if at the time of the accident the
claimant was earning more than the state average weekly wage then in effect;
Utah Administrative Code R. 612-1-lO.D.l. is consistent with principles enunciated by the Utah
Supreme Court:
At the outset, we note that the purpose of the workers' compensation acts is to
'secure workmen...against becoming objects of charity, by making reasonable
compensation for calamities incidental to the employment....' (Citation omitted).
This compensation is not in the form of damages for injury, as in a tort action, but
in the form of payments to compensate for the loss of employability resulting from
the injury. (Citations omitted). Marshall v. Industrial Comm'n of the State of
Utah, 681 P. 2d 208, 211 (Utah 1984)( emphasis in original).
The Court in Marshall went on to hold:
[t]otal disability does not mean 'that the injured employee must be unable to do
any work at all.' The fact that an injured employee may be able to do some kinds
of tasks to earn occasional wages doe not necessarily preclude a finding of total
disability to perform the work or follow the occupation in which he was injured.
His temporary disability may be found to be total if he can no longer perform the
duties of the character required in his occupation prior to the injury. Id. at 212.
(Quoting: Entwistle v. Wilkins. 625 P. 2d 495, 498 (Utah \9U){emphasis in
original).
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In fact, the Utah Supreme Court in a another case elaborated on the principles articulated in
Marshall:
Although the fact that an employee returns to work following an industrial injury
may be relevant in determining the employee's ability to perform the duties of his
occupation and thus may be a factor in assessing whether the employee has
suffered any loss of earning capacity, that fact alone is not conclusive of his
ability to work, nor is it dispositive of the issue of his earning capacity. We have
recently held that: *[o]nly where the employee returns to work under normal
conditions will the presumption of no loss of earning capacity stay unassailed.'
Norton v. Industrial Comm 'n, 728 P. 2d at 1028.
In Norton, we held that the fact that the claimant returned to work and
continued to work for six years following his industrial accident 'did not
automatically disqualify him from receiving permanent total disability benefits,
where the facts indicate[d] that throughout the remainder of his employment he
was not restored to health. Peck v. EIMCO Process Equipment Co.. 748 P. 2d
572, 577 (Utah 1987).
As set forth in Section III.B. Mr. McGee earned $17.50 per hour, 40 hours per week average, or
$700.00 per week while employed for LPI as of July 4, 2001. The average weekly wage for the
State of Utah as of July 4, 2001 equaled $554.00 per week, or $13.85 per hour. The two jobs
located by Mr. Evertson as lens stylist and car rental reservationist at most paid $13.00 per hour,
or less than the average weekly wage for the State of Utah as of July 4, 2001. Accordingly, no
evidence existed that any employment remained reasonably available to Mr. McGee as of the
date of the hearing pursuant to the requirements of Utah Code §34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv) and Utah
Administrative Code R. 612-1-lO.D.l.c.
Utah Code §34A-2-413(6) "[a]llows an employer to submit a reemployment plan for an
employee who is seeking permanent total disability benefits." Color Country Management v.
Labor Commission. 436 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 6 (Utah App. 2001). A reemployment plan is
permissive, not mandatory, and sequentially comes after a preliminary finding of permanent total
disability under Utah Code §34A-2-413(l). As stated in Utah Administrative Code R. 610-110.C:
For permanent total disability claims arising on or after May 1, 1995, Section
34A-2-413 requires a two step adjudicative process. First the Commission must
make a preliminary determination whether the applicant is permanently and
totally disabled. If so, the Commission will proceed to the second step, in which
the Commission will determine whether the applicant can be reemployed or
rehabilitated.
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Perhaps Mr. Evertson identified suitable jobs for which Mr. McGee could be rehabilitated and
retrained as part of a reemployment plan. The reemployment plan presented by Mr. Evertson
more appropriately belonged to the second phase of the permanent total disability proceeding.
V. ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the respondents LPI Services and/or Travelers shall pay
Michael McGee permanent total disability subsistence benefits in the amount of $471.00 per
week from February 28, 2002, through April 12, 2004 in the lump sum amount of $51,946.59,
with appropriate credit and offsets for compensation already paid for the time period. The
respondents LPI Services and/or Travelers shall thereafter commence subsistence payments to
Michael McGee in the amount of $471.00 as of the date of this order pursuant to Utah Code
§34A-2-413(6)(b)(i). Further benefits to be determined after accomplishment of the procedures
set forth in Utah Code §34A-2-413 (6)(a).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondents LPI Services and/or Travelers shall pay all
medical expenses reasonably related to Michael McGee's injuries incurred on July 4,2001
according to Utah Code § 34A-2-418, and the medical and surgical fee schedule of the Utah
Labor Commission. The respondents LPI Services and/or Travelers shall also pay travel
allowances under Utah Administrative Code, Rule 612-2-20, plus interest at eight percent (8%)
per annum, under Utah Code § 34A-2-420 (3) and Utah Administrative Code, Rule 612-2-13.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that attorneys' fees shall be paid by the respondents LPI Services
and/or Travelers directly to Richard Burke according to Utah Administrative Code R 602-2-4,
which fees shall be deducted from the benefits paid by the respondents to Michael McGee
pursuant to this order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if the respondents intend to submit a reemployment plan, the
respondents shall file notice of such intent within ten (10) days of the date of this order. The
respondents shall file the reemployment plan within twenty (20) days after filing the notice of
intent to file the plan, or within thirty (30) days of the date of this order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that by separate notice hearing shall be set with respect to any
reemployment plan submitted by respondents.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that as this is an Interim Order and not a Final Order, any
Motion For Review or Appeal of this Order shall be reserved until the Final Order is issued in
this matter. Accordingly, deadlines with respect to Motions For Review and/or Appeal shall not
commence to run until after the Final Order is issued in this case.
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Dated this 12th day of April 2004,

M. La Jeunesse
strative Law Judge
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TROY CARTER,
Petitioner,
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Richards, Brandt
Miller & Nelson

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND ORDER ON SECOND
STEP PROCEEDINGS

vs.
EOTT ENERGY OPERATING LTD and/or
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND,
Respondent.

Case No. 99522,99523
Judge Debbie L. Hann

HEARING:

Room 336 Labor Commission, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah,
on June 29,2005 at 10:00 AM.. Said Hearing was pursuant to Order and
Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Donald L George, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The petitioner, Troy Carter, was present and represented by his/her
attorney Kenneth E Atkin Esq.
The respondents, Eott Energy Operating Ltd and Wausau Insurance Co.
were represented by attorney Mark Sumsion Esq. The respondents, Great
Lakes Timber Co. and Workers Compensation Fund were represented by
attorney Lori Hansen Esq. The Employers Reinsurance Fund was
represented by attorney Elliot R Lawrence Esq.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law Including Preliminary Determination of
Permanent Total Disability and Order was issued by Judge George on March 26, 2004 ordering,
among other things, that permanent total disability compensation in the form of subsistence
benefits be paid to the petitioner beginning November 2,1999 as the result of the industrial
injury of December 13,1998 when the petitioner was employed by the respondent, EOTT
Energy Operating Ltd. An interlocutory Motion for Review was subsequently filed. The
Commission Appeals Board upheld the determination of permanent total disability and remanded
the case for second step proceedings in an order issued January 25,2005.
At the hearing, the respondents agreed that if the plan was ordered, they would agree to pay the
difference between the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury and the petitioner's
wages until those wages reached the level of this average weekly wage.
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Following the June 29, 2005 hearing, the case was transferred to Judge Debbie L. Hann for
decision. Because the only issue in these proceedings is related to reemployment as related to
the permanent total disability compensation claim, "respondents" shall refer to EOTT Engery
Operating Ltd. and their insurance carrier, Wausau.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The respondents submitted a vocational report entitled Proposed Reemployment Return to Work
Plan for the petitioner and an Addendum to that report prepared by Mark Hedrick, a qualified
vocational rehabilitation counselor.
Mr. Hedrick identified the potential vocational opportunity for the petitioner of parts salesperson,
a job for which 15 potential employers were identified in the Uintah Basin, where the petitioner
resides. In the February 12,2005 Addendum, the mean wage for these positions was $12.90 per
hour, the entry level wage was $9.00 per hour and the median wage was $13.50 per hour.
Mr. Hedrick did not believe the petitioner required any additional training before being placed in
a new position. His report notes that the petitioner's current work history and education give
him the skills necessary to perform the functions of this position. The petitioner attended Utah
State University from 1995 through 1997 an obtained 96 credits. The petitioner has also
completed a truck driving school program and served in the U.S. Army Reserve from 1989 to
1995. The petitioner has previously performed light mechanical duties and operated heavy
equipment and pneumatic tools.
The petitioner was earning $750.00-800.00 per week at the time of the December 13,1998
industrial injury which entitled the petitioner to the maximum weekly compensation rate for
permanent total disability of $414.00. The state average weekly wage at that time was $487.00.
The current state average weekly wage is $609.00 and it was $589.00 at the time of the hearing.
There was no dispute that the respondents were paying and would continue to pay the ordered
subsistence benefits during the proposed reemployment efforts.
The respondents' reemployment plan is reasonably designed to return the petitioner to gainful
employment. The definition of "other work reasonably available" contamed in the
Commission's rule does not apply to the evaluation of "gainful employment." The evaluation of
"other work reasonably available" is part of the first step analysis of whether a person is
preliminarily permanently totally disabled. "Gainful employment" is the standard to be applied
in second step proceedings to evaluate possible rehabilitation. There is nothing in the wording of
the statute or rule which ties these terms together in a way that would require similar definitions
or analysis. That being said, the undersigned acknowledges the result could be viewed as
somewhat inconsistent. A job offered as "other work reasonably available" in the first step
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proceedings may not pay enough to meet the rule requirement and, in part, lead to a tentative
finding of permanent total disability. Then, in the second step proceedings, that same job could
be offered as "gainful employment" in a reemployment plan and the employee could be required
to accept it, assuming it was vocationally appropriate. But, the legislature, in adopting 34A-2413, did not use similar language in the second step proceedings that would evidence an intent to
apply similar standards, such as using the words "reasonable work" as opposed to "gainful
employment." The statute also evidences a clear preference that an employee return to some
type of work, even at part-time, minimum wage, in those provisions that require such
employment to be accepted when an employee cannot be reemployed and is receiving permanent
total disability compensation. But, contrasting with this preference is the underlying intent of the
worker's compensation to be more than a subsistence program. Compensation is not based upon
a subsistence level payment standard and is tied to an injured worker's level of income at the
time of the injury up to the average state weekly wage and compensation rates can pay well
above the current minimum wage of $206.00 per week. The Utah Injured Worker
Reemployment Act, defines "gainful employment" in terms of wage level to only require "an
opportunity for earnings" and does not set forth a minimum standard. As submitted, the
reemployment plan meets the requirement of gainful employment.
Successful rehabilitation of the petitioner is possible. The respondents shall diligently pursue
and the petitioner shall fully cooperate in the reemployment plan.
PRINCIPLES OF LAW
Utah Code § 34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv) requires as an element of proof that an employee is
permanently totally disabled that".. .the employee cannot perform other work reasonably
available..." when considering the employee's age, education, past work experience, medical
capacity and residual functional capacity.
"Other work reasonably available" for purposes of Utah Code § 34A-2-413 is defined by
Commission rule at R612-1-10(D)(1) as:
.. .Subject to medical restrictions and other provisions of the Act and rules, other work is
reasonably available to a claimant if such work meets the following criteria:
a. The work is either within the distance that a resident of the claimant's community
would consider to be a typical or acceptable commuting distance, or is within the distance
the claimant was traveling to work prior to his or her accident;
b. The work is regular, steady, and readily available; and
c. The work provides a gross income at least equivalent to:
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(1) The current state average weekly wage, if at the time of the accident the claimant was
earning more than the state average weekly wage then in effect; or
(2) The wage the claimant was earning at the time of the accident, if the employee was
earning less than the state average weekly wage then in effect.
If a preliminary determination of permanent total disability is made, the employer has the option
as part of the "second step proceedings" to request the employee to participate in a
reemployment plan. The reemployment plan must be prepared by a qualified rehabilitation
provider and be ".. .reasonably designed to return the employee to gainful employment. Utah
Code § 34A-2-413(6)(a)(ii)(A). The plan may also include ".. .retraining, education, medical
and disability compensation benefits, job placement services, or incentives calculated to facilitate
reemployment funded by the employer or its insurance carrier." Utah Code § 34A-2413(6)(e)(i). The plan must include ".. .payment of reasonable disability compensation to
provide for the employee's subsistence during the rehabilitation process." Utah Code § 34A-2413(6)(e)(i).
Once a plan is submitted, hearing is held to ".. .consider evidence regarding rehabilitation" and
' \ . .review any reemployment plan submitted by the employer or its insurance carrier..." Utah
Code § 34A-2-413(6)(B)(iii). Only "[i]f a preponderance of the evidence shows that successful
rehabilitation is not possible..." may benefits be awarded as a final determination. Utah Code §
34A-2-413(6)(f).

In the event a final order of permanent total disability is entered, that benefit ends when an
employee is ".. .capable of returning to regular, steady work." Utah Code § 34A-2-413(7)(a)(ii).
An employer or insurance carrier may also ".. .provide or locate for a permanently totally
disabled employee reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time work in a job earning at least
minimum wage provided that employment may not be required to the extent that it would
disqualify the employee from Social Security disability benefits..." and the employee is required
to cooperate and accept such employment. Utah Code § 34A-2-413(7)(b) and (c).
"Gainful employment" is defined for purposes of the Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act at
Utah Code § 34A-8-104(3) as:
Gainful employment" means employment that:
(i) is reasonably attainable in view of the industrial injury or occupational disease; and
(ii) offers to the injured worker, as reasonably feasible, an opportunity for earnings.
(b) Factors to be considered in determining gainful employment include the injured
worker's:
(i) education;
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(ii) experience; and
(iii) physical and mental impairment and condition.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Successful rehabilitation of the petitioner is possible under the proposed reemployment plan.
The respondents shall continue to pay subsistence payments of $414.00 per week less any offset
required by Utah Code § 34A-2-413(5) and less attorneys fees payable directly to Kenneth E.
Atkin, Attorney at Law, pursuant to R602-2-4, U.A.C.
The respondents shall pay all costs associated with implementation of the reemployment plan.
The petitioner shall cooperate with reemployment efforts.
The respondents shall diligently pursue the reemployment plan.
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the respondents, EOTT Energy Operating Ltd and
Wausau Insurance shall diligently pursue the plan prepared for the petitioner and pay all costs
associated with the plan and that the petitioner shall cooperate with the plan.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the respondents, EOTT Energy Operating Ltd and
Wausau Insurance shall continue to pay subsistence payments of $414.00 per week less any
offset required by Utah Code § 34A-2-413(5) and less attorneys fees payable directly to Kenneth
E. Atkin, Attorney at Law, pursuant to R602-2-4, U.A.C..
DATED March 8, 2006.

/H

M^"^
Debbie L. Hann
Administrative Law Judge
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS

A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this
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decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review
within 20 days of the date of the Motion for Review.
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct
the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its
response. If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Board, the review will
be conducted by the Utah Labor Commission.
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